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When Louis VI ascended to the throne in 1108 AD, he faced substantial 
challenges as the fifth monarch of the Capetian dynasty; he confronted the problem of 
stopping the general decline of the monarchy and achieved this in a way that reasserted 
the foundations of the crown as the sole dominant figure in the royal domain and a 
respected lord throughout the kingdom.  For centuries, his predecessors struggled to 
retain the royal rights that had been slipping away since the death of Charlemagne.  Louis 
VI’s own father was unable to maintain basic control in the territory traditionally 
managed by the crown, the royal domain.  Unlike previous works on the advancement of 
royal authority that limit the achievements of Louis VI merely to the elimination of the 
insubordinate nobles, this thesis examines further the relationship between the king and 
the local royal officials and the impact of the Church on this relationship.  To overcome 
the problems threatening the very existence of the monarchy, Louis VI consolidated the 
authority of the crown within the royal domain by reducing the threat of local lords 
hostile to the crown and denying the attempts of royal officials to engineer a resurgence 
in the usurpation of royal rights on the local level.  This process of consolidation of local 
authority occurring throughout the course of the reign contributed to the state-building 
process of the French kingdom by tying local government to the central administration.   
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The king relied on his connection with the French clergy, first to eliminate the presence 
of insubordinate vassals, and second to prevent the exploitation by royal officials. 
Where his father, Philip I, had failed, Louis VI successfully established an 
effective cooperation with the French Church and the papacy.  Presenting donations to 
various abbeys and priories and founding new abbeys and chapels were both products of 
his efforts to restore the damaged relationship between the Church and the monarchy.  By 
repairing this relationship, he was able to maintain the Church’s assistance in government 
administration and secure its approval in his conduct towards local lords.  As part of the 
process of reconciliation, Louis VI exerted himself in defending monasteries against the 
aggression of the lower nobility, who had repeatedly harassed the clergy without penalty 
during the previous reign.  
The legal justification for protecting the Church served the king’s purposes well 
in his continuous conflicts with insubordinate castellans.  These barons held small 
amounts of territory, but they were still hard to supervise due to their possession of 
fortified military structures.  The French king regularly defended towns and ecclesiastical 
properties with mixed results against oppressive nobles, who had attacked these 
politically and militarily weak localities.  In spite of some disappointing campaigns, his 
losses were negligible, while his victories brought the destruction or seizure of castles 
and towers of geographical importance.  As he solidified his control in the royal domain, 
he began to broaden the range of his military involvement into the counties and duchies 
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outside of the Île-de-France.1  This interaction in the other parts of the kingdom earned 
the crown a revitalized reputation that had been absent for centuries in Western Europe. 
The achievements of Louis VI as a commander brought territorial and financial 
gains that directly affected the king’s ability to extend his authority further.  New royal 
castles provided stability instead of disorder to the surrounding countryside.  The judicial 
and financial standing of the crown improved as more towns came under the direct 
management of royal officers.  This general increase in royal control solidified the 
jurisdiction of the throne within the royal domain.  While Louis VI succeeded in 
diminishing the authority of local lords, improving the tattered image of the throne, and 
increasing royal holdings, these were not his only achievements.   
As royal officials began to replace barons as the source of public authority, the 
officials also inherited the responsibilities of government administration.  The addition of 
new royal rights and the installation of local administrative officers, known as prévôts, 
represented the extension of royal authority into these new areas.  Louis VI marketed 
these offices, and because of this lax means of employment, a number of the royal 
officers abused their judicial and financial authority.  The prévôts’ exploitation of the 
Church forced the king to intervene on behalf of the clergy again.  This intervention 
prevented the local officials from establishing a local autonomy and reducing royal 
jurisdiction similar to that previously held by the castellans. 
When examining the expansion of the king’s authority in the royal domain, there 
is a need to consider the accessible sources.  The difficulty in analyzing any aspect of 
Louis VI’s reign stems from the limitations on the preservation of primary sources dating 
                                                 
1 The Île-de-France is a term used to describe the royal domain because it was a small “island” of territory 
in the middle of France under the direct control of the king and surrounded by the powerful counties and 
duchies that comprised the rest of the kingdom. 
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from the period.  Chronicles written by clergymen surviving from the reign comprise a 
significant number of the sources available to scholars, but present problems of 
interpretation.  As members of the Church, the authors of the chronicles wrote their 
histories with religious undertones and often condemned or praised individuals who the 
clergymen recognized as impious or pious men.  The writings of these ecclesiastics 
recount mostly the lives of royalty and nobility, including close to nothing in the 
categories of government administration or local history.  On the other hand, these 
documents correspond with each other with regard to numerous specific events and dates, 
denoting their reliability for general information.  Although the authors were all 
clergymen, their backgrounds varied significantly.  They differed in their official 
positions within the Church, places of origin, political allegiance, and opinions of the 
French monarch.  Because of this, these documents provide greater literary social and 
geographic diversity than is commonly accepted.  In most of these sources, the authors 
dedicate modest amounts of their writings to the king and more to their particular regions 
or locations of origin. 
Representing the most significant source of Louis VI’s life, The Deeds of Louis 
the Fat focused on the interaction between the king, the nobility, and the Church, yet the 
author’s biases require careful consideration.2  Suger, who became a powerful advisor to 
both Louis VI and his son, was the abbot of St. Denis, a traditional favorite for the crown, 
from 1122 to 1151.  The foremost concerns of Suger and his writings were the elevation 
of the monarchy’s reputation through the acts of Louis VI, which implies that many of his 
accounts contain some degree of embellishment.  Still, Suger’s position in the royal 
                                                 
2 Abbot Suger of Saint-Denis, The Deeds of Louis the Fat, trans. Richard Cusimano (Washington D.C.:  
The Catholic University of America Press, 1992). 
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household as a close counselor to the king probably gave him firsthand knowledge or 
reliable secondhand reports of many of the events he described.  The abbot was also not 
so predisposed towards promoting the image of the king as to avoid explanations of royal 
losses.  Looking past the exaggerations of this source, a clear description of the king’s 
achievements emerges pertaining to the specific local lords that Louis VI had difficulties 
with and fortifications he challenged.  Hence, this is the most valuable source from the 
list of chronicles because of its concentration on the king. 
Another such chronicle, The Murder of Count Charles the Good, related the 
events surrounding the murder of Count Charles of Flanders in 1127.3  Galbert of 
Bruges’s biases stem from his devotion to the deceased Count and his denunciation of 
those involved in the murder.  Nevertheless, the author was present in Bruges during the 
occurrence, which substantiates his importance as an eyewitness.  Because Galbert held 
no direct allegiance to the king, there was little need to exaggerate any references to the 
king’s actions.  Although the core of Galbert’s account revolved around the events 
occurring in Bruges, he supplied significant insight into the king’s political and military 
influence in the territory of the royal vassal, the Count of Flanders.  The clergyman also 
provided some details about the interaction between the king and the nobility of the 
northeastern county. 
The author or authors of the majority of the Chronicle of the Abbey of Morigny, 
France, which source recounted parts of the history of the abbey, remain unknown.4  This 
text focused on the progression of the abbey through threats from neighboring churches 
                                                 
3 Galbert of Bruges, The Murder of Charles the Good, trans. James Bruce Ross (New York:  Columbia 
University Press, 1940). 
4 A Translation of the Chronicle of the Abbey of Morigny, France, c. 1100-1150, trans. and ed. Richard 
Cusimano (Lewiston, NY:  Edwin Mellen Press, 2003). 
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and barons, the addition of donations, and the communications between the monks of the 
abbey and the papacy.  Perhaps the primary source that provided the least amount of 
information concerning the king, it also appeared to be the least subjective when 
commenting on the king’s activities.  The Chronicle offered some commentary on Louis 
VI’s attempts to secure the protection of the abbey and its property and briefly described 
his encounters with a specific local lord. 
The subject of Ordericus Vitalis’s extensive writings was the development of the 
Church in England and Normandy under the rule of the English kings.  His four-volume 
work, The Ecclesiastical History of England and Normandy, contains valuable references 
to Louis VI.5  Although the majority of his work described events in territories controlled 
by the English, Vitalis devoted a considerable amount of time to the French king and his 
interactions with the clergy and his experiences against hostile nobles within the French 
kingdom.  The clergyman portrayed Louis VI in a favorable manner, giving the monarch 
a significant degree of respect; however, it is likely that Vitalis received his information 
through secondhand accounts. 
Abbot Guibert rendered a concise account of the murders of clergymen in Laon, 
occurring in 1116, following the description of his life as a monk in The Autobiography 
of Guibert Abbot of Nogent-Sous-Coucy.6  This source recounted Louis VI’s response to 
the capture of Laon by a violent castellan and his dependents.  Guibert’s work presented 
the worst depiction of the king out of all the chronicles, as the clergyman referred to the 
king as greedy and lazy.  He described an eventual ultimatum laid down by the high-
                                                 
5 Ordericus Vitalis, The Ecclesiastical History of England and Normandy, 4 vols.  (New York:  AMS Press, 
1968). 
6 Abbot Guibert of Nogent-Sous-Coucy, The Autobiography of Guibert Abbot of Nogent-Sous-Coucy, ed. 
G.G. Couton, trans. C.C. Swinton Bland (New York:  E.P. Dutton and Co., 1925). 
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ranking officials of the Church, yet the author offered a thorough description of Louis 
VI’s endeavors to punish the insubordinate baron.  Although Guibert’s assessment of the 
king was more negative than the other sources, the basic elements of the monarch’s 
activities continued to be consistent. 
Aside from the chronicles, the only other remaining primary source is the 
collection of  royal charters and acts that have endured since the reign and are found in 
Achille Luchaire’s Louis VI, le gros:  annales de sa vie et de son règne (1081-1137).7  
The different sorts of information included in the documents ranged from charters of 
acceptance for donations made to the Church by wealthy individuals, to commands sent 
to royal officials or members of the noble class.  Dates, names of individuals holding 
royal or ecclesiastical offices, and locations were among the many significant pieces of 
information given in these documents.  This compilation contained the most fundamental 
information concerning the administrative work of both the royal court and local 
government.  From this source, forms of taxation, privileges of the peasantry, and royal 
rights become clearer.  Perhaps the most important aspect of these sources was their 
general uniformity with the chronicles of the clergymen, confirming rather than refuting 
the activities recorded in their writings and giving the ecclesiastics additional credibility.  
Unique problems dissimilar to those of the chronicles arise when examining the royal 
charters.  The records were concise and simple, failing to provide considerable amounts 
of detail pertaining to the specific topic of any given charter. 
The secondary works that pertain to the reign of Louis VI focus on the king’s 
problems with local and regional lords and with members of his central government.  The 
                                                 
7 Achille Luchaire, Louis VI. (le gros); annales de sa vie et de son règne (1081-1137) (Paris:  Auguste 
Picard, 1890). 
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earliest modern work emerged as early as the late nineteenth century, yet interest in the 
field has declined significantly since the 1970s because of the limitations of sources and 
the larger number of sources available for subsequent reigns.  Most of the early 
monographs concerning the French king analyzed his military accomplishments and the 
territorial gains secured for his successors.  The majority of recent publications that 
address Louis VI have done so in the context of wide-ranging topics, most commonly the 
Capetian dynasty as a whole.  There have also been numerous works concerning the 
development of the French Church in the twelfth century.  These publications have a 
tendency to concentrate on the expansion of monasticism in the French kingdom, while 
contending with the relationship between the clergy and the crown.  Few monographs 
offer any insight into the local administration of the royal domain in the early twelfth 
century. At present, there is no work that focuses directly on the connection between the 
throne and the local government in the extension of royal authority under Louis VI. 
One of the earliest secondary sources concerned primarily with the progression of 
the kingdom during the reign of Louis VI is the introduction to the Annales de sa vie, 
provided by Achille Luchaire in 1891.8  Within this source, Luchaire created a general 
survey of the king’s life using primarily the government documents accompanying the 
work and the chronicle of Suger.  Luchaire divided the narrative into the different stages 
of Louis VI’s life:  his youth, the time he spent as king-designate, and the years of his 
reign.  He described the unsteady relationship between Louis VI and his vassals in the 
kingdom and argued that the king and the Church shared an important connection 
because of the clergymen’s functions as the household officers and the king’s rights over 
royal abbeys. 
                                                 
8 Luchaire, Annales de sa vie, xi-cc. 
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Eight years prior to the publication of Annales de sa vie, Luchaire produced a 
two-volume work, Histoire des institutions monarchiques de la France sous les premiers 
Capétiens, on the different characteristics of the government throughout the early 
Capetian era.9  In this narrative on the history of the French kingdom, the author defined 
the different officials in the central and local governments. He described the various 
forms of taxation and royal rights under the control of the monarchy that provided the 
main sources of revenues through the centuries.10  Luchaire furnished for the first time 
the argument that the prévôts abused their duties, yet he described the abuses as a general 
occurrence under a number of the kings, not explaining the impact of these activities 
during particular reigns. Another assertion found within the work was the strong 
connection that existed between the Church and the monarchy. 11 
The next significant secondary source constructed to investigate the reign of 
Louis VI was James Thompson’s dissertation, titled The Development of the French 
Monarchy under Louis VI, le Gros.12  Much like Luchaire, Thompson devoted a 
significant portion of his work to the military accomplishments of Louis VI along with 
the judiciary operations of the royal court.  Thompson offered a limited amount of 
investigation into the local government of the realm.  He suggested that the prévôts’ 
exploitation of their offices benefited the king by solidifying royal authority within their 
localities and that special prévôts, known as palatins, became a supervisory office to 
handle specific complaints against local officers.  A contradiction arose in Thompson’s 
                                                 
9 Achille Luchaire, Histoire des institutions monarchiques de la France sous les premiers Capétiens (987-
1180), 2 vols. (Paris:  Imprimerie Nationale, 1883). 
10 Luchaire, Institutions monarchiques, 1:92-107. 
11 Luchaire, Institutions monarchiques, for the abuses of the prévôts, see 1:228; for relationship between 
crown and Church, see 2:57. 
12 James Westfall Thompson, “The Development of the French Monarchy under Louis VI, le Gros, 1108-
1137” (Ph.D.  diss.,  University of Chicago, 1895). 
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arguments as he asserted that the king selected prévôts, but later he admitted that the king 
sold the offices.13  For this author, the relationship between crown and Church differed 
significantly from Luchaire’s findings.  The king often disagreed with the French clergy 
and papacy over the investiture of ecclesiastical officials though not to the same degree as 
the Holy Roman Empire.  Thompson argued that the two parties also disputed over the 
right of the king to bring clergymen to trial and that the king only donated to the 
monasteries for political practicality rather than intentions of spiritual kindness.14 
A thesis pertaining to the activities of the reign is Louis VI and His Domain, 
composed by John Maple.15  In his work, Maple focused largely on establishing an 
inventory of the possessions of the monarchy.   Part of the inventory included the 
possessions of the crown both inherited and gained (particularly the acquisition of 
property and royal rights through military conflicts and purchase), while the other part 
consisted of properties detached from the control of the crown largely through donations 
to the Church.  According to Maple, the most significant factor in Louis VI’s 
ecclesiastical donations was his desire for divine favor.  Maple correlated the number of 
donations with the years of most significant military activity, yet a closer look at the 
donations made throughout the reign showed a substantial number and amount given 
almost every year.16  Maple did agree with Thompson in stating that the abuses of the 
prévôts strengthened instead of damaged the extension of royal authority.  Unlike 
Thompson, however, Maple argued that the relationship between the king and the Church 
                                                 
13 Thompson, “Development of the French Monarchy,” 55-56. 
14 Thompson, “Development of the French Monarchy," 68-74. 
15 John Thomas Maple, “Louis VI and His Domain” (M.A.  diss.,  University of Virginia, 1973). 
16 Maple, “Domain,” 45-46. 
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extended beyond the political and administrative realm into shared financial 
investments.17 
In 1980, Elizabeth Hallam published her comprehensive study of the social, 
political, and economic development of the French kingdom, titled Capetian France, 
which encompassed the entire Capetian dynasty.18  Hallam provided accounts of Louis 
VI’s military conquests over local lords, and claimed that the king’s work (although 
incomplete) made the royal domain safer and augmented the royal resources.  She 
described the crown’s connection to the Church as one of necessity; the clergy remained 
vital for the basic functions of Capetian central and local government.  The subject of 
local royal officials received little consideration as Hallam only acknowledged that 
prévôts benefited from their office and at times caused problems for the king.19   
The monograph entitled France in the Making, by Jean Dunbabin, concentrated 
on the progression of the monarchy and the regionalism of the kingdom as it became 
more unified during the early parts of the Capetian dynasty.20  Rather than highlighting 
the campaigns of Louis VI (who she found was a failure as a general), Dunbabin focused 
on the king reasserting his rights as more than just the theoretical figurehead in the feudal 
social system for the basis of extending royal authority.  Unlike Luchaire and Hallam, 
Dunbabin claimed that the actions of the prévôts caused their unpopularity, yet they 
contributed significantly to the authority of the princes of the kingdom.  She further 
argued that the princes reprimanded these officials only to display their charity to the 
                                                 
17 Maple, “Domain,” for the arguments on the prévôts, see 68; for the financial relationship between crown 
and Church, see 72. 
18 Elizabeth M. Hallam, Capetian France 987-1328 (New York:  Longman Group Limited, 1980). 
19 Hallam, Capetian France, for the military accomplishments, see 115-118; for the role played by the 
Church in government, see 6, 18;  for the mentioning of the prévôts, see 85-86. 
20 Jean Dunbabin, France in the Making 843-1180 (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1985). 
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public, while in actuality the princes commended the abuses of the officials.21  Thus, her 
approach concerning local officials tended to agree with the arguments of Maple and 
Thompson. 
In 2002, Marcus Bull contributed a chapter titled “The Church” to the series 
France in the Central Middle Ages concerning the development of the French Church 
through papal reform and increased levels of monasticism.22  This article elaborated on 
the Church and its function during twelfth-century France.  Bull argued that clergymen 
were often loyal supporters of the Capetian kings because of the royal protection usually 
provided to the monasteries.  According to Bull, both the wealth and the education found 
in the Church were vital assets to the kings as they developed their authority within the 
kingdom. 
While there have been numerous studies on the progression of the royal domain 
under the Capetian dynasty and Louis VI in particular, their explanations for the 
extension of royal authority are incomplete because they did not intend to include the 
impact of local authority in the scope of their publications.  Some historians, including 
Hallam and Luchaire, found that the extension of royal authority comprised the 
elimination of local lords and the growth of the central government.  This argument is 
important, yet it does not contend with the problems Louis VI confronted concerning the 
exploitations of prévôts.  By preventing these aggressive royal officials from abusing 
their offices, the king essentially prevented them from developing the same military, 
judicial, and financial footing that the barons used to usurp royal control after the 
                                                 
21 Dunbabin, Making, for the feudal position held by the king, see 262-265, 295; for the appraisal of the 
prévôts, see 285-286. 
22 Marcus Bull, “The Church,” in France in the Central Middle Ages (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 
2002). 
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collapse of the Carolingian dynasty.  Simply put, the prévôts held the same local 
responsibilities that the local lords had started out with.   
Other historians, such as Dunbabin, Thompson, and Maple, have dealt with the 
problem of prévôtal exactions, yet their conclusions bring new concerns to the 
development of the royal domain under Louis VI.  They claim that the monarchy 
benefited from the harsh treatment of the prévôts towards the peasantry and the 
monasteries because it solidified royal control; however, this meant that Louis VI 
accepted a form of local autonomy similar to the form that occurred during the late ninth 
and tenth centuries that disintegrated the central authority of the Carolingians.  This does 
not support the notion that the monarchy was heading towards a centralization of the 
government in the form of the king’s court.  Instead, the argument conforms to the same 
principle that allowed local lords to usurp public authority within the regions of the 
kingdom.  Although these historians have created a strong foundation concerning the 
advancements of the monarchy during the reign of Louis VI, their arguments concern 
other aspects of the reign and not local government.  This necessitates a reexamination of 
the king’s interaction with the Church, the impact of that relationship on the elimination 
of local lords and the supervision of royal officers, and the consolidation of royal 
authority through the control of the prévôts, which is the purpose of this work. 
The achievements of Louis VI in the advancement of royal interests in his domain 
did not end with the elimination of local lords.  Although this began the resurgence of the 
kingdom, it was only the first step in asserting royal control on the local level, which 
itself represented an important factor in the centralization of government.  Louis VI 
continued to display his dominance in the localities of the royal domain by restricting the 
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actions of the prévôts when those actions negatively affected the rights or image of the 
crown.  Actions such as excessive taxation and abuses of judicial authority prompted the 
king to exempt populaces from specific rights of the royal officers.  This continued 
display of direct royal control prevented the emergence of the officials as a new regime 
of local lords benefiting from the royal rights.  Louis VI’s consolidation of local authority 
within the royal domain allowed his involvement in matters outside of his direct domain 
and provided the means for his successors to extend the authority of the throne further 
than it had been in centuries. 
Vital to the development of the king’s authority, the clergymen were far from 
enemies of royal advancement.  While the king did make many donations, this did not 
result solely from his desire for divine recognition but from his attempts to reconcile with 
the Church that had lost trust in the throne for their protection.  Louis VI hoped to regain 
political support from the powerful ecclesiastical lords and to continue the use of 
clergymen as the primary source of government administration.  The Church provided the 
means for the king to attack the autonomy of the local lords and later assisted in 
restraining the aggression of the royal officials.  Prévôts abused their privileges with both 
the peasantry and the clergy alike; however, the limited access of peasants to the king 
rendered them helpless to the exactions of the local officials.  Because of the close 
relationship between the crown and the Church, Church officials were able to 
communicate with the king and bring the unjust exactions of prévôts to royal attention.  
As the crown grew in military and political strength, so did the assurance of royal 
protection over the monasteries.  While the relationship was at times tenuous, Louis VI 
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effectively established a working cooperation with the Church that lasted throughout the 





CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CROWN PRIOR TO LOUIS VI 
 
 
Following the death of Charlemagne in the early ninth century, the kingdom of 
the west Franks immediately began to experience problems that eventually reduced the 
French monarchy to a minimal figure in the governance of the kingdom.  Warfare among 
the descendants of Charlemagne, the economic and political stress arising from the 
frequent Viking raids, and the increased authority of the great barons of the kingdom 
resulting from those raids reduced the crown to a theoretical figurehead of an 
increasingly violent social system known as feudalism.  Although the king retained his 
status as the pinnacle of this social system, the nobles often ignored the weakened leader 
in their actions.  As the monarchy lost much of its control over outlying provinces far 
from the political center of the royal domain, the crown and Church developed an 
important relationship that benefited them both.  In exchange for protection, benefices, 
and support for the papacy, the kings received religious backing for their policies.  Louis 
VI depended on his relationship with the Church and the ideology of his prominent 
position in the feudal hierarchy to begin the process of consolidating the kingdom.  When 
he succeeded to the French throne, he had already understood the difficulties facing him; 
the weakness of the monarchy in 1108 was due to the breakdown of central authority 
occurring in the previous three centuries and continuing through the reign of his father, 
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Philip I.  Thus, it is important to explain briefly that process to understand the 
significance of Louis VI’s accomplishments because it was this relationship with the 
Church that allowed him eventually to regain dominance of the royal domain and 
supervise corrupt local officials. 
 The tradition of partible inheritance during the ninth century prompted the 
division of the vast empire Charlemagne and his father had built.23  This division quickly 
became a source of political confusion in Western Europe.  There were three sections of 
the former empire following the Treaty of Verdun in 843:  East Francia, West Francia, 
and Lotharingia.24  Verdun did not conclude the quarrels between the descendants of 
Charlemagne as they disputed over territorial boundaries and control of the vassi 
dominici.25  Fighting among the Carolingians continued long after Verdun because of the 
desire of each to gain more land and authority at the expense of the other two.  There 
were also issues of geographical influence.  Everyone wanted part of the central area of 
Charlemagne’s empire because that was the location of Carolingian political and 
financial strength.26  These disputes led to political confusion for the powerful nobles of 
the old empire, who now had to decide which party to support. 
 Focusing more specifically on the West, the internal struggles between the 
Carolingians left the kingdom of west Francia vulnerable to outside attacks from the 
Saracens, Magyars, and particularly the Vikings in the ninth and tenth centuries. These 
attacks directly affected the political structure of the kingdom.  Scandinavians used their 
                                                 
23 During the ninth century, ruling families practiced partible inheritance, which was the division of an 
inheritance among the legitimate male descendants. 
24 Hallam, Capetian France, 4. 
25 Sidney Painter, The Rise of the Feudal Monarchy (Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 1967); see also 
for the vassi dominici, who were officials that supervised government functions in the outer provinces of 
the empire, 8. 
26 Dunbabin,  Making, 1. 
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advanced ships to travel up the French rivers and loot the towns and monasteries.27  
Kings were unable to respond quickly enough to defend successfully against the Vikings.  
These penetrations into the kingdom prompted the shift in society towards the primary 
need for defense, as counts began to maintain large private forces to maintain castles for 
that defense.28   
Viking attacks sparked the transition of the government in the Frankish kingdom 
from a central authority, whose power rested in the crown, to a decentralized structure 
where the great lords acquired or assumed the judicial and financial rights formerly 
controlled by the monarchy.  As the military forces of the lords increased, the kings 
delegated more and more authority to the barons; officials formerly loyal to the crown, 
along with common landholders, became dependents of these counts or dukes rather than 
the king.  The powerful counts, whose titles became hereditary, even converted the lesser 
nobility into vassals.29   
Dominant lords began to usurp the royal rights of taxation and justice by keeping 
the revenues rather than sending them to the central government and imitating the 
authority of the monarchy.  These lords used the need to defend against the Vikings as 
justification.  Counts under the early Carolingians held the responsibility of tax collection 
for the crown.  As authority shifted to the counts, the king was unable to reverse the 
ability of the lords to collect and keep tolls from traveling merchants and further charges 
for participation at markets.30  The lords also developed their own courts to handle legal 
disputes in their counties free from royal supervision.  By the reign of King Odo in 888, 
                                                 
27 Painter, Feudal Monarchy, 8. 
28 Dunbabin, Making, 40, 43. 
29 Painter, Feudal Monarchy, 8. 
30 Dunbabin, Making, 7. 
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the kings no longer hindered the growth of localized authority because they viewed this 
development as essential for containing the Viking raids.  Powerful nobles began to 
replicate the execution of government administration by the kingdom for their own 
counties and duchies, relying on the authority of the king to substantiate their own.31 
The distribution of authority did not stop with the counts and dukes; even lesser 
lords took advantage of the weak political structure to increase their own local strength.  
These local lords both received and seized local control from the king or the high-ranking 
counts.  Castellans emerged in the eleventh century and began to pocket the revenues 
from taxes collected for their lords and to impose new forms of taxation on the peasantry, 
such as the forced use of county mills or wine presses owned by local lords.32  As the 
castellans’ local authority grew, the sources of forced taxation became routine and were 
part of the hereditary privileges of the lords.33  The peasantry was unable to complain 
with any measure of success because the castellans controlled the local courts.34  Similar 
to the dukes and counts, the castellans were able to establish their positions as hereditary, 
not allowing their lords to reclaim castles.  Others constructed their own castles without 
comital authorization.35  Therefore, the accumulation of formerly royal privileges ranged 
over the entire noble class; the great magnates assumed authority from the king and the 
lower nobles from the counts and dukes. 
This delegation of authority inevitably reduced the control of the monarchy over 
its vassals.  Eventually, the kings would no longer have any authority within the counties 
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without the permission of controlling barons.36  When the kings permanently granted the 
lands to the nobles for proper defense against the Vikings, the royal power decreased 
because there was no longer an extended presence throughout the kingdom.  This limited 
the control of the monarchy to the shrunken royal domain, which decreased the resources 
of the crown.37  When Hugh Capet came to the throne in 987, the French monarch had 
only a limited area of direct control known as the Île de France, or the royal domain.38  
By the late ninth century, the barons had increased their combined political authority to 
such an extent that they were able to elect kings based solely on their ability to defend 
against the Vikings.39  The elective nature of the crown also contributed to reducing the 
king to merely “the head of the feudal hierarchy.”40  The early Capetians fared no better 
than the Carolingians, as the monarchy continued to lose authority in the early years of 
the dynasty.41  Establishing a continuous dynasty was one of the few accomplishments 
sustained by the first three descendants of Hugh Capet. 
Because one of the major themes of this thesis concerns the relationship between 
the king and the counts and castellans, there is a need to explain the terms “feudal 
hierarchy,” “vassal,” and “homage” to understand the social structure of the early 
Capetian period and the position of the French monarchy in that system.42  In theory, a 
feudal relationship existed only within the noble class between a lord and his vassal.  The 
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lord provided the protection and livelihood to maintain a vassal, who, in return, gave his 
loyalty, counsel, and military service.  To support a vassal, a lord provided a fief or 
benefice consisting of money or, more often, land.43  To establish this social link, an 
individual presented himself in a ceremony to his eventual lord and swore fealty and 
homage.  Ensuring the commitment confirmed through this ceremony, “the aim of 
fidelity and vassalage was to create artificial links between men to bind them as surely as 
if they were blood relations.”44  This social structure benefited the early Carolingians, 
who maintained considerable control over their vassals; however, once the kings began to 
lose their authority, the hierarchy began to lose significance.45 
By the eleventh century, members of the nobility did not always adhere to this 
theoretical structure, which caused a number of significant problems for the kings.  The 
hierarchy began with the king and extended to his immediate vassals, and then to their 
vassals, yet the political and military power in France did not extend from the top, so the 
ties of vassalage became less important.46  The early Capetians struggled with keeping 
their rights and authority, while powerful counts and dukes surrounded them territorially.  
Even minor lords created problems by building strong fortifications and challenging royal 
rights.47  During any given reign, the king did not always have the resources necessary to 
assert his authority over a vassal attempting to abuse his privileges or those of the 
crown.48 
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The question arises as to how the monarchy was able to endure during this 
weakened period until its resurgence in the twelfth century.  The crown survived because 
of the political restraints the nobility placed on each other, and the kings maintained some 
of their important royal prerogatives.  First, the nobility wanted to maintain the balance of 
power.  None of the dukes or counts wanted to see their powerful counterparts usurp the 
title and become more powerful than themselves.49  Although the authority of the 
Capetians seemed frail, the barons allowed them to maintain their position, believing the 
royal resources could not interfere with their own territories.  Another factor preventing 
the nobles from discarding the king was the necessity to maintain at least the theory of 
the social hierarchy provided by feudalism.  The monarchy’s status was secure because 
“a duke or margrave could not repudiate the legitimacy of a king’s office, a count 
repudiate a duke’s, a castellan a count’s, without repudiating the very basis of his own 
authority over his own subalterns.”50   
While the Capetians had trouble with their local lords, lesser magnates had similar 
troubles with their own.  Many other lords held fragmentary rights over their vassals 
similarly to the king.  Powerful counts and dukes experienced insubordinate behavior 
from their vassals just as the kings had, hindering the resources of the lords.  In this 
sense, the crown was not as weak as traditionally believed.51   
The Capetian kings maintained their position as the dominant figure in the social 
structure keeping the possibility open for political resurgence.  They were able to retain 
their right to issue charters and kept the right to require oaths of fidelity.52  Although the 
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nobles often defied the feudal hierarchy, they never completely discarded the theory.  
Even lords more powerful than the king did not claim independence from him.53  As long 
as the vassals continued to offer fidelity and  homage, it meant they accepted the 
jurisdiction of the king and his right to bring his vassals to court when legal arguments 
arose between them.54  These valid claims of the monarchy allowed the Capetian kings to 
maintain their title through the periods of unsteady authority and resources. 
The Church had sustained a significant role in the political sphere in Western 
Europe since the sixth century, and its participation in the feudal system and relationship 
with the French monarchy require a brief examination here.  The royal government relied 
heavily on the Church because its universal use of Latin was vital to diplomacy across 
Europe, and Latin was the sole language of government documents and law.55  On the 
local level, parish churches established an important position within the community, and 
the land controlled by monasteries raised their operations to that of lay landlords, 
including owning serfs, and demanding labor and charging rent from their peasants.56  
Many members of the clergy came from the noble class and their entrance into the 
Church often came with a non-returnable donation.  Nobles who donated land also 
transferred ownership of the unfree tenants as well.57 
When Christianity encountered the early Germanic kingdoms, a close relationship 
quickly formed.  The Church began to advocate the idea that the king “had been 
appointed by God to keep order, protect the weak from the strong, and especially to 
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maintain the Christian church and faith.”58  In France more specifically, the relationship 
between the crown and the Church remained a strong one.  The clergy acted as vassals 
much as did lay barons, providing counsel and military aid through their retainers.  Royal 
bishoprics and monasteries needed royal permission to fill vacant ecclesiastical posts, and 
before completing any elections, the monasteries had to confer with the king.59  The 
clergy also made the connection between the peasantry and crown where the king could 
not; they included his name in regular masses and gave him an honorary position during 
important festival masses.60  The Church chose to side with the king to protect its own 
interests against nobles hostile towards the clergy.  Part of its influence rested in its 
ability to advocate the divine nature of the monarchy.61  The clergy’s attitude of royal 
support continued into and through the Capetian dynasty. 
The immediate predecessor of Louis VI, his father Philip I, had positioned the 
crown in an even more precarious state than the previous rulers had by nearly severing 
the important relationship with the Church.  By absconding with the Count of Anjou’s 
wife and arresting clergymen in opposition to this action, he was attacking one of the 
crown’s oldest supporters.  Church officials summarily excommunicated him for his 
actions.  At other times, Philip I prevented Prince Louis from punishing nobles.  In 1102, 
the king deterred his son from attacking Chambli, the castle of an insubordinate noble, 
Mathew of Beaumont, after he had assisted in the unlawful seizure of the castle of 
Luzarches.62  Authors contemporary to the king from all parts of Western Europe labeled 
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him as an inefficient ruler more preoccupied with his love affairs and culinary matters 
than government administration.63 
When Louis VI came to the throne in 1108, he faced significant problems 
resulting from the continued decay of royal power that had developed over the previous 
centuries.  The great magnates, who controlled large portions of the kingdom with virtual 
independence, chose when and where they would adhere to the commands of the king, 
their feudal lord.  The powerful dukes and counts did not heed royal decrees, and the 
royal domain was relatively small when compared to the combined territories of his more 
powerful vassals.64  Within the royal domain, castellans continued to abuse their attained 
judicial and financial exploitation of the localities, and used their fortifications to defend 
against any royal threat of punishment.  It appeared as though the monarchy was heading 
towards replacement by another, more powerful, dynasty or complete extinction as the 
mighty principalities became smaller independent kingdoms.   
Yet Louis VI was able to use his seemingly feeble resources, kept intact through 
the centuries, to improve the state of the monarchy and return it to prominence.  He 
restored the crown’s relationship with the Church and used his right to protect its 
extensive network of abbeys and priories to eliminate insubordinate castellans within the 
royal domain, which will be discussed in the following chapter.  When he had the 
necessary military presence available, he enforced his feudal right to call vassals to court 
for trial.  Most importantly, he restricted the authority of the royal officials, or prévôts, 
who replaced the subdued castellans on the local level, preventing them from establishing 
a hereditary characteristic to their offices and succeeding the castellans as public figures 
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of exploitation.  These accomplishments allowed Louis VI’s successors to regain large 
portions of the kingdom and reclaim their rights as the pinnacle of the feudal hierarchy 





COLLABORATION BETWEEN CROWN AND CHURCH 
 
 
Between 1108 and 1137, the Church played a central role in the development of 
the kingdom and its functions, and the king exploited his influence over the Church to 
advance royal authority.  Louis VI needed the churchmen for the efficiency of his 
government and political support; however, he retained certain regalian rights over 
abbeys and bishoprics that proved politically and financially useful.  For these factors, it 
was necessary for the king to intervene on behalf of the Church against barons who 
would violently seize its property.  Thus, the crown’s rapport with the Church was truly 
unique.  Louis VI had to defend the abbeys and bishoprics to retain the support of the 
clergy that was so essential for royal accomplishment.  Indirectly, this collaborative 
relationship with the clergy led to the centralization of the royal authority because the 
claims of the king for taking up arms against local nobles were often for the protection of 
the Church and its affiliates.  It is not the purpose here to deny the personal piety of the 
king, yet the interaction between the two parties undeniably contained more than just 
religious objectives.  To achieve any success in advancing the interests of the crown, 
Louis VI had to maintain an effective cooperation with the Church. 
At the outset of the reign, Louis VI had to reestablish the throne’s unsteady 
relationship with the Church. The religious institution had been, and would remain, a  
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strong supporter of the Capetian dynasty.  As described in chapter two, many historians 
agree that this support was one of the reasons for the survival of the crown during the 
centuries of weak royal authority.  Yet when Philip I died in 1108, he left damaged 
relations between the crown and the Church that required some degree of repair.  When 
Ivo of Chartres denounced the second marriage of Philip I to the count of Anjou’s wife, 
Betrada, the king had Hugh Le Puiset, a constant enemy of the clergy, imprison the 
bishop.65  Early in his reign, Philip I exiled Bishop Guy of Beauvais, after which the 
bishopric’s lands experienced repeated robberies.  The king arrested Bishop Renaud of 
Langres and severed Raoul from his archbishopric of Tours in 1082.66  Although not to 
the same degree as the Holy Roman Emperor, Philip I carried on some disputes with the 
papacy over lay investiture.67  Philip I damaged his relationship with the Church by 
ostracizing himself from many leading members of the clergy, which may or may not 
have directly influenced his ability to control the royal domain.  Whatever the 
consequences of Philip’s reign may have been, Louis VI had to spend much of his reign 
to secure the support of the Church. 
Louis VI quickly began to restore this rift through multiple actions that 
reconfirmed ecclesiastical support for his secular activities and the continuation of his 
rights over royal abbeys and bishoprics.  Upon ascending to the throne, he immediately 
asked the clergymen to support him against their common enemies.  Promoting their 
political involvement, the king asked for the clergy’s support in eliminating destructive 
nobles in the French kingdom.68  Although it is safe to assume that the king did not 
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expect military assistance from the churchmen, this request illustrates his belief that royal 
success depended on the services and cooperation of the clergy.   
 Throughout the reign, Louis VI donated to existing abbeys and churches and 
founded others, which was another attempt to first reconcile then assure the support of 
the clergy.  To the Abbey of Morigny, for example, he granted “a royal charter for the 
protection of this place and all our future and present possessions.”69  A number of 
surviving charters demonstrate his donations and establishments throughout his rule.  In 
1109, early in the reign, Louis VI donated the vacant lands of Nids to the abbey of Saint-
Père de Chartres and agreed not to collect any customs from its new inhabitants.70  He 
was still bestowing lands on the Church in the last years of his reign.  A sizeable piece of 
land went in 1137 to the priory of Notre-Dame of Longpont in the land surrounding 
Montlhéry.71  Although land was a frequent donation made by the king, it was not the 
only type of grant he presented to the Church.  Other grants included the right to graze 
animals in forests, gifts of servants, and annual revenues.72  
 Louis VI established new abbeys and churches to improve his relationship with 
the Church further.  In 1113, “on the advice of the archbishops, the bishops, and the great 
[nobles] of the kingdom getting together at Châlons, the king found[ed] the abbey of 
Saint-Victor of Paris.”73  Territories, rights over rivers, houses, and royal peasants were  
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among the numerous possessions the king granted to this new institution. 74  As these 
donations and foundations illustrate, Louis VI continuously sought to strengthen his 
association with the Church by publicly displaying it as a recipient of royal favor. 
The king also hoped to secure such positive relations for the reign of his son.  
After the future Louis VII had received the title of king-designate, his father began to 
include him in many donations.  In 1137, Louis VI exempted the abbey of Notre-Dame 
de Montermoyen at Bourges from numerous taxes, pointing out he had done this “in the 
presence and with the consent of his son Louis.”75  The king wanted to establish a 
positive image of serving the Church for his son before he ascended the throne and 
gained direct control of the government.  The ideology of a unified relationship between 
the crown and the Church would continue in the reign of Louis VII.76 
Defending the Church and its affiliates was a high priority for the king, who 
initiated numerous acts of royal intervention against the nobles and local royal officials in 
his efforts to retain ecclesiastical support.  First, Louis VI guarded the clergymen from 
local lords, who often stole property from monasteries and churches.  He later defended 
the abbeys and priories from the financial burdens of heavy taxes imposed by royal 
officials.  The king was so adamant about maintaining the security of the monasteries that 
he  destroyed the fortifications of a traditional royal supporter, Burchard of 
Montmorency, who had refused to accept the decision of the royal court in a case of 
dispute with the Abbey of Saint-Denis.77  To properly defend the Church and maintain a 
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positive rapport, Louis VI was willing to reprimand his own noble allies.  Although these 
topics will receive further attention in later chapters, the king’s attempt to protect the 
monasteries was another means by which he aimed to improve relations with the Church. 
As king, Louis VI held a number of rights and privileges over royal abbeys and 
bishoprics.  Religious institutions were still a source of patronage.  One of the king’s sons 
held two offices as abbot by his fifth birthday and would later receive four more.  
Another source of patronage came with the creation of new monasteries, such as the 
abbey of Saint-Victor of Paris.  This provided opportunities for clergymen to seek 
ecclesiastical offices within these new institutions.  Because of the loss of investiture 
during the reign of Philip I, Louis VI “did not sell bishoprics or abbeys, but he supervised 
elections, insisted on his consent being obtained, and maintained his regalian rights where 
he could.”78  While he could no longer interfere directly in elections, a ceremony still 
occurred for the homage and fealty of the bishops to the king for any secular power that 
might have come with their post.79 
Another privilege held by Louis VI was the regal right of spoil, which contributed 
to the financial assets of the crown.  Because of the Church’s dependence on the king for 
protection, he received the revenues from any vacant bishopric after the death of any 
royal bishop.80  Those revenues included any profits made on the cultivation of lands 
under the ownership of the bishopric and the rights to any taxes levied on the peasants of 
the bishopric.  The king continued to control the finances of the vacant office until an 
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election declared a new bishop.  Clergy and crown alike regarded this royal right as a 
temporary fund for the king’s expenses in defending the Church.81 
The king viewed new bishops as vassals who owed their lord homage, and the 
protection offered in return provided the opportunity for Louis VI to intervene in areas 
traditionally outside his authority.82  Although holding no direct rights within the 
Auvergne, south of the royal domain, the monarch used his right to protect the diocese of 
Clermont to travel into the Auvergne on two occasions.  The king journeyed roughly two 
hundred and thirty miles south of Paris in 1122 and again in 1126 in an effort to restore 
the Bishop of Clermont back to the city, as Count William VI had illegally taken 
possession of it.83  Without this right to protect the Church, Louis VI had no other 
opportunity to involve himself in this area of the kingdom.  The king was so weak outside 
of his limited domain that he depended on the “material and financial resources of the 
Church and the goodwill of Rome.”84   
Another, perhaps less important, reason for the king to defend the Church was the 
financial relationship between the two parties.  Agricultural investments linked the king 
to specific churches in at least two instances.  A charter completed between 1134 and 
1137 illustrates an agreement of pariage involving Louis VI and the abbey of Saint-
Pierre of Fossés and the priory of Chârtres.85  Within this charter, the abbey and priory 
gave the lands of Fontenai to the peasants of the king for agricultural production “on the 
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condition that the revenues for this land will be equally partitioned between them and 
him.”86  The king established similar conditions with the monastery of Saint-Euverte d’ 
Orléans concerning its lands of Boulai.  The monastery provided the land, the crown 
provided the peasantry, and the two split the profits equally.87  In 1136, the king made an 
agreement with the bishop of Paris for his chapter’s land, Champeau.  For providing the 
land to the king, the bishop would receive a third of the revenues from the various taxes 
collected on the land.  This charter goes further than the previous two, specifying that the 
royal prévôt gave fidelity to the bishop for that land.88  Here, the financial projects 
between the crown and the clergy presented another reason for the king to intervene 
against local nobles and later the prévôts.  Protecting the Church also meant protecting 
his agricultural investments. 
The Church often offered political support to the king through its ecclesiastical 
authority.  In politics, “archbishops and bishops from northern and north-eastern sees 
were among the Capetians’ most important supporters” because of the crown’s ability to 
protect them.89  High-ranking church officials supported the monarch by applying 
ecclesiastical pressure on the opposing castellans.90  Abbot Suger described how the 
clergy met at a council in Beauvais to renounce Thomas of Marle as a noble through the 
means of an anathema supported by a papal legate.91  Church officials had 
excommunicated another local lord named Leo before he died along with his men during 
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the siege of his castle, Meung-sur-Loire, in 1103.92  Hugh Balver of Laversine received 
excommunication for his hostile acts towards a town under the ownership of the Abbey 
of Saint-Denis.93  A dispute arose between the king and Hugh Le Puiset in 1111, and a 
royal charter described the conflict as a “feudal and ecclesiastic coalition against Hugh 
Le Puiset.”94  This display of ecclesiastical assistance demonstrates the willingness of the 
Church to support the king against insubordinate nobles, especially those who had 
threatened the interests of the monasteries.   
Clergy maintained government positions in the household of the monarch, which 
both served the interests of the king and advanced churchmen through royal offices.  At 
the royal court, church officials held important positions as counselors and officers.  
Count Raoul of Vermandois was the only non-ecclesiastic who filled an office at the 
royal court.95  Abbot Suger was one of the king’s most influential counselors, yet held no 
official lay title, maintaining only his abbacy.  Before Suger, Stephen de Garlande held a 
considerable amount of control in the curia regis as seneschal and chancellor.  He also 
possessed numerous ecclesiastical benefices, being a favorite of the king.96  Thus, it was 
necessary for Louis VI to protect and enhance through royal offices this social group, 
which had accepted important responsibilities of central administration. 
Church officials also fulfilled routine duties in the administration of the central 
government.  Members of the church had access to the highest available educational 
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training.97  Furthermore, the clergy were the sole source of consistently educated men 
able to handle significant amounts of government documents.98  The crown used the 
clerical skills of the churchmen in the different departments of government.  These 
administrative clerics received revenues for living expenses from the royal household for 
their government functions.  Men of low birth, such as Abbot Suger, played an important 
part in the political machinery even without formal government titles, and they did not 
have the military or financial independence to cause problems similar to those presented 
by the barons.99  Essentially, the church officials were willing to provide religious 
support, the services of their clerical education, and government counsel in exchange for 
protection from local authorities and rewards through patronage. 
On the local level, the clergy also held a great deal of authority.  In the absence of 
secular nobility, “bishops were important agents of local government, with substantial 
public authority invested in them.”100  An example of this authority comes from the 
writings of Ordericus Vitalis, who claimed that priests under the direction of their bishops 
led (but did not necessarily fight alongside) their parishioners on military campaigns in 
the ranks of the king.101   Because “most great churchmen were the younger sons and 
brothers of the great princes and magnates,” it was scarcely abnormal for them to retain 
high degrees of public authority.102  As ecclesiastical officials held royal offices and 
exercised public authority on the local level, it was necessary for Louis VI to maintain a 
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positive and functioning relationship with them to promote his leadership in the royal 
domain.   
 Churchmen were also partially responsible for the increased prestige experienced 
by the French crown during the early twelfth century.  Suger of Saint Denis, Galbert of 
Bruges, the unknown author of the Chronicle, and even Ordericus Vitalis (writing 
primarily about England and Normandy) portrayed Louis VI in a positive manner in their 
works.  In his work concerning the monarch’s actions against the nobility of the royal 
domain, Abbot Suger repeatedly claimed that Louis VI “could not put aside what he had 
grown accustomed to in his youth, namely safeguarding the churches, protecting the poor 
and the needy, and working for the peace and defense of the kingdom”.103  Galbert of 
Bruges described how the barons of Flanders yielded to his authority upon his arrival in 
Bruges.104  The text of the Chronicle described the many ways in which the king 
provided for the abbey of Morigny’s defense, and Ordericus Vitalis depicted the noble 
king and his campaigns against common criminals.105  These churchmen portrayed Louis 
VI as restoring the authority of the French monarchy by commanding authority over the 
nobility and demanding respect from the other monarchs of Europe. 
 The development of literature depicting the French king favorably came at a time 
when the English kings were experiencing harsh criticism from ecclesiastics.  The 
chronicles of England, also written by churchmen, did not approve of their kings in the 
same way the French counterparts did, for two important reasons.  In England, the cost of 
war to defend the crown from competitors forced the Norman and Angevin kings to 
heavily tax their subjects, including the Church, while in France, nobles did not contest 
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the dynasty, which allowed the kings to limit the taxes imposed on the Church.106  The 
second source of ecclesiastic frustration involved the vying for political favor through the 
court rituals in England.  High-ranking clergymen sought to perform these rituals because 
it was a sign of political status.  This aspect arose due to the English royal court being the 
sole social focal point of the realm.  Across the English Channel, there were other social 
centers represented by the courts of the lesser nobility, keeping the court rituals of the 
king separate from politics.107  By refraining from excessively taxing the Church and 
keeping the clergy from competing for political preference, Louis VI was able to 
maintain the reputation as a pious, effective ruler, who used his divinely sanctioned office 
to serve the needs of the Church.108 
While the monarchy continuously tried to defend the churches, abbeys, and 
priories, the barons and later prévôts targeted these ecclesiastical institutions for their 
wealth and political opposition.  Rural monasteries were among the wealthiest 
landholders during the twelfth century.  The majority of the members comprised the sons 
of wealthy nobles, who, unlike most peasants, were able to afford the costs for clerical 
training.   The fathers of these monks often donated land to the abbeys where their sons 
lived.  Abbeys also collected revenue from the tenants of their land and actively sought to 
purchase more surrounding estates.109  Similar to the Viking raiders of previous centuries, 
the nobles and local officials realized the nonviolent nature of the clergymen, and 
targeted churches as a source for monetary extraction through forced taxation or by 
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means that were more violent.  The local lords perceived Philip I’s lack of intention to 
protect the abbeys and bishoprics when he was often in disputes with them and the 
papacy and punishing certain clergymen himself. 
The different levels of the relationship between the crown and the Church 
stimulated the two parties to assist each other as much as possible, while still protecting 
their own private interests.  Once Louis VI became the sole ruler, he retained the support 
and the services of a powerful institution in the Church without sacrificing his regalian 
rights over the royal monasteries.  The Church was able to protect its interests involving 
lay investiture and lost no ground over free elections, yet the clergy backed the king 
against the nobility, provided its members as counselors to the king, wrote positive 
chronicles about the monarchy, and fulfilled the duties of the bureaucracy.  Both king and 
clergy relied heavily on one other to carry out difficult tasks they were unable to fulfill 
themselves.  Without the Church and its assistance in the various functions of local and 
central government the monarchy struggled to increase its authority, as seen in the reign 
of Philip I.  Louis VI recognized the essential position the Church played in the 
development of his kingdom.  Thus, when he protected the Church and its recipients, he 
was not merely preserving the property of the monasteries and the safety of its 
inhabitants; he was saving the foundations of royal support. Eventually, he would use his 
rights to protect abbeys and priories as the excuse to establish his authority within the 





EXTENSION OF ROYAL AUTHORITY 
 
 
During the reign of Louis VI, one of his accomplishments that had previously 
eluded his predecessors was the consolidation of authority over the nobility within the 
royal domain.  Nobles had asserted their authority on the local level with the protection 
offered by fortifications and the assistance of their own vassals.  They dominated local 
government and benefited financially from the powers of justice and taxation, which had 
long been alienated from the control of the throne.  Although these lords were vassals of 
the king of France, they did not adhere to the commands of the crown because of the 
relative weakness of the king’s military capabilities.  In an effort to reinstitute the 
authority of the monarchy, Louis VI began successfully to eliminate the nobles who did 
not submit to his authority.  The French king used multiple reasons to justify his attacks 
on the nobility, including rights of inheritance and illegal seizure of fortifications, but the 
most successful tactic he employed involved calling rebellious nobles to the royal court 
for crimes committed against the Church.  This legal justification brought support from 
other nobles and provided the necessary reason to eliminate the military structures 
maintaining the authority of the insubordinate lords.  The removal of lords unwilling to 
accept royal authority within the king’s domain allowed Louis VI to consolidate his 
control in these localities, take advantage of the financial gains that accompanied the
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military success, and create a revived prestige for the French throne recognized by the 
greater vassals.   
In 1107, before the death of Philip I and prior to the accession to the throne by 
Prince Louis, the prince realized he needed a stronger strategy than superior military 
forces to attain his goals.  He came to this realization after his failed attempt to take over 
the County of Rochefort through questionable hereditary claims by means of military 
coercion.  He carried out an extensive campaign against Guy of Rochefort and his 
fortifications at Chevreuse, Montlhéry, Bretencourt, and other towns belonging to the 
count.  Guy of Rochefort was able to gain the aid of many nobles and successfully 
resisted Prince Louis.110  Following this defeat, Louis began to understand that he needed 
a stronger legal justification to acquire the necessary support, and a more focused 
management of his military resources to reduce the insubordinate nobles.   
Learning from his earlier mistake, Louis VI was later careful to justify his acts of 
warfare against the nobles through legal means.  One of the first nobles the French 
monarch challenged was Burchard of Montmorency, who had attacked the lands of the 
Abbey of Saint-Denis.  Before advancing against Burchard and his allies, Louis VI called 
the baron to his court to stand trial for his actions.  On another occasion, the king fought 
Mathew of Beaumont for improperly seizing the castle of Luzarches from his father-in-
law.  The king advanced against Beaumont only after the baron had not presented himself 
at the king’s court upon royal command.  Even the monarch’s half-brother, Philip, was 
not exempt.  After granting two castles to Philip, the king summoned him to court to 
answer claims that he had mistreated the poor.  In 1109, Louis VI called Haimo of Berry 
to court for a case involving the absconding baron in an inheritance suit.  Military forces, 
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led personally by the king, captured Haimo in Berry, brought him to trial, and finished 
the inheritance case.111   
Other nobles began to acknowledge the summons of the royal court and appeared 
before the king, which demonstrated the growing recognition of royal power.  Hugue 
Balver of Laversine actually came to the court of the monarch upon command.  This local 
lord had had suit brought against him by Abbot Suger of Saint-Denis.  The abbot claimed 
acts of “violence and exactions committed by this seigneur at the place of Laversine, 
town of the abbey” as the primary reasons for excommunicating Balver for a year.112  
Louis VI was able to facilitate a peace agreement between the two groups, and if either 
broke that peace, the transgressor was to be subject to the courts of the realm.113 
In an extreme instance, Louis VI used the legal justification of avenging the 
murders of a bishop, archdeacon, and numerous priests to subjugate the town of Laon in 
1114.  Thomas de Marle had taken the town north of Paris in an attempt to protect 
wealthy townsmen who had killed several ecclesiastics.  A response to these acts of 
violence against churchmen came from other members of the clergy, as Thomas de Marle 
“had done such evil deeds everywhere that archbishops and heads of churches made 
complaint to the King saying that they would not carry on the services of God in his 
realm, unless he took vengeance.”114  The French king laid siege against Thomas de 
Marle at the improvised fortifications at the Abbey of St. John, Crécy, and later at his 
castle, Nouvion.  Eventually, the king destroyed both Crécy-sur-Serre and Nouvion.115  It 
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is interesting to note that unlike other nobles who lost their fortifications, Thomas de 
Marle escaped royal punishment temporarily through a payoff to the king.116  This might 
suggest that the king was willing to punish nobles financially, assisting his own assets, to 
attempt to avert costly military conflicts.  Here, the justification for attacking the local 
lord appears to be stronger because the campaign came following not just the destruction 
of church property but the deaths of ecclesiastical officials. 
These examples show the importance of the legal justification for the military 
conflicts of the king.  Louis VI was unwilling to attack the nobles without a legal basis 
because that would have provided a cause for future complaints from the barons for 
unwarranted attacks, possibly negating any royal achievements.  Legal justification also 
prevented any assistance for the insubordinate nobles from other lords, such as what had 
happened in the military loss against Guy of Rochefort, because the legal grounds gave 
no excuse for others to interfere lest they become the next royal target.  As vassals of the 
king in the feudal hierarchy, if the nobles did not appear in the king’s court after a direct 
summons, absence provided the legal basis needed for Louis VI to advance against the 
vassal without a trial.  The king exerted his military capabilities and reasserted the rights 
of his feudal position by taking away the lands of his vassals.117  This process ensured 
that, following a royal victory, the extension of authority was concrete and any 
punishment was subject to the will of the monarch and not contestable. 
The list of specific castles destroyed during Louis VI’s time as king-designate and 
through his reign as king is quite extensive and needs clarification to impart the full scope 
of his achievements against the barons.  Following the defeat of Buchard of 
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Montmorency, Prince Louis burned the noble’s buildings and destroyed his defenses in 
1101.  Victorious over Drogo of Mouchy in 1101 as well, the prince burned the castle, 
Mouchy-le-Châtel, to the ground.  In 1103, Prince Louis set fire to the castle of Meung-
sur-Loire with the defiant Leo of Orléans and his dependents still inside.  Although 
Prince Louis forgave Viscount Milo of Troyes for capturing the castle of Montlhéry in 
1105, the royal troops still destroyed the castle except for the main tower.  When Hugh 
Le Puiset lost his castle some time before 1111, he later rebuilt it, and when he revolted 
again in 1112, the monarch had to destroy the fortifications of Le Puiset for a second 
time.  As already mentioned above, the king dismantled the castles of Nouvion and 
Crécy-sur-Serre in 1114.  Also in 1114, he destroyed the tower of Amiens.  The last 
fortification eliminated by the king was Coucy in 1130.118   
 The account produced by Ordericus Vitalis that described the king’s conflict with 
Count Theobald IV of Chartres and Blois explained the necessity for ridding the realm of 
hostile castles.  Vitalis described the numerous disputes between the king and Count 
Theobald resulting from the actions of the latter’s vassals.  After committing acts 
considered injurious to the royal domain, the vassals of the count “sought refuge under 
the protection of their powerful lord, and, relying on his support, often dared to engage in 
criminal undertakings against God and the Church.”119  Without the protection of the 
local lords, these knights were no longer able to perform the criminal acts and retreat to 
strong defenses. 
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Louis VI experienced a great deal of success policing his domain; however, he did 
not always achieve his military goals, a failure which needs examination.  While still only 
prince, Louis failed when he besieged Mathew of Beaumont and Burchard de 
Montmorency at the castle of Montmorency in 1101.  Beaumont again bested the prince 
the following year at Chambli.120  In 1111, Count Theobald IV successfully defended his 
castle at Meaux against the crown’s forces.121  Abbot Suger and Ordericus Vitalis both 
relate the conflicts between the French and English monarchs, and the overwhelming 
political and military strength of Henry I often gave him the edge over his French 
counterpart.  Even with the justification necessary to subdue his enemies, their defenses 
were often too resilient for the royal forces.   
So, how was Louis VI able to consolidate his authority when he had mixed 
military results?  In many instances when he abandoned a campaign against an enemy, he 
later returned to succeed in subduing the noble (such was the case with Burchard at 
Montmorency and Beaumont at Chambli).122  More importantly, the French monarch 
never lost his own fortifications or so many of his resources as to hinder future 
campaigns.  Most of his losses came at sieges when he retreated; no sources 
contemporary to Louis VI have record of him taking a defensive position during a siege, 
while many of his victories came with significant benefits.   
Louis VI asserted royal authority through peaceful measures as well with the 
acceptance of royal commands by the nobles or through royal justice.  In a display of 
political power, “the king abolished certain unjust exactions which were made to profit 
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Eude, castellan of Beauvais.”123  Eude had used his prévôt to decide court verdicts in the 
castellan’s favor.124   
In many of the cases involving royal justice, the Church was a significant 
benefactor.   Another case described the attempts of a low-ranking noble named Stephen 
to recover a lost inheritance from the Church, but he abandoned the suit after royal 
intervention.  Garsdon, a benefactor of the Abbey of Morigny, had donated the estate of 
Gomerville to the abbey at the time of his death; however, his mother Adelais and her 
niece’s husband, Stephen, tried to regain the donation through the right of inheritance.  
Eventually, Stephen claimed he would besiege the manor and murder the inhabitants if 
the monks did not relinquish the property.  Louis VI interceded on behalf of the abbey, 
and threatened Stephen, who then relinquished the inheritance claim.125 
Another suit occurred between Hugh Le Puiset and Abbot Bernier of Saint-
Florentin in Bonneval.  Here, the baron forced multiple payments of gîte on the abbey for 
its lands of Baignolet, and the king ruled in favor of the Church again, declaring that 
Puiset could ask for the gîte only once a year.126  Earlier in the reign, Louis VI had sent 
word to all of the ecclesiastical and lay barons in the domain “that he concedes to the 
abbey of Saint-Denis a market at Touri (on Beauce), and abolishes the oppressive 
customs established on the land of this abbey by the seigneurs of Puiset.”127  For the 
second time, the king forced Hugh Le Puiset to abandon his claims to unjust customs 
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publicly.128  These examples show that the nobility were no longer completely 
disregarding royal commands and court decisions.  The king’s military campaigns 
contrasted with Philip I’s lack of enthusiasm towards the end of his reign.  If the 
castellans did not adhere to royal orders, they at least had to weigh the gains and losses of 
potential retaliation for their insubordination.  Lords began to understand that ignoring 
the crown now presented the possibility of military attacks from the throne. 
Louis VI dedicated his reign to consolidating the central authority within the royal 
domain, something that his Capetian predecessors had been unable to accomplish.  For 
centuries, the nobility had usurped the powers of the king to advance their own wealth 
and authority on the local level, destabilizing the central authority of the crown.  With the 
aid of castles and towers, these lower-level nobles were long able to defy the monarchy 
with its few military resources, yet Louis VI’s ability to focus on one local lord at a time 
allowed him to destroy the hostile sites or add them to his own assets.  In most of his 
confrontations with the local lords, he used legal justification to ensure the longevity of 
any significant gains made through warfare.  This validation, which consisted of 
attacking insubordinate vassals who did not appear at the court of their lord when 
summoned or simply refused to adhere to royal court decisions, stemmed from the feudal 
characteristics of the noble class that had been developing since the reign of 
Charlemagne.  These same societal aspects provided Louis VI with the opportunity to 
wage war against those lords who chose to deny the rights of the king within the feudal 
hierarchy.  Although he was not always successful in defeating his opponents through 
military campaigns, he never lost a battle to such a degree as to impede severely the 
progress of consolidation.   
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Louis VI’s active military role in the defense of the Church or in the punishment 
of those who murdered high-ranking ecclesiastical or noble subjects within the royal 
domain enabled him to extend his authority to his more distant vassals when the 
opportunities presented themselves.  He called a vassal directly subordinate to the Duke 
of Aquitaine to the royal court by asserting his right to defend a bishopric under his 
protection.  He also established himself as a dominant figure in the political and military 
situation following the murder of Charles, Count of Flanders. 
Perhaps the most significant display of legal justification occurred when Louis VI 
commanded the Count of Auvergne, who governed lands outside of the royal domain in 
southern France, to appear at his court in 1126.  The king had commanded the count to 
appear because of his unlawful capture of Clermont from the bishop of that town.  Before 
any military engagements happened, the Duke of Aquitaine offered to deliver his vassal, 
the count, to the king’s court personally in exchange for an immediate truce.129  This 
illustrates that the king’s claim as protector of the church allowed him to intervene 
beyond the immediate royal domain and to call nobles to his court for trial who were not 
his immediate vassals.130 
Another opportunity presented to the king to assert his command outside of the 
royal domain came following the murder of Charles “the Good”, Count of Flanders, in 
1127.  Louis VI first took advantage of the open inheritance of the county, as the 
deceased count had no surviving heirs, by strongly recommending and successfully 
placing one of the crown’s close allies, William Clito, on the seat of the county during a 
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quick election by the lords of Flanders.  The king had already proclaimed William Clito 
as count before the arrival of the barons and only their confirmation was necessary, 
demonstrating significant royal influence.131  The lords submitted to the authority of the 
king in two instances:  they accepted his request that they travel to Arras during the siege 
to elect a new count, and they agreed to the crown’s nomination.   
Later, upon arriving at Bruges, where the murder had occurred and where those 
responsible had taken up a defensive position in the castle, the king established control 
again when he undertook the military leadership of the siege.  He maintained the 
organization of military procedures until the criminals surrendered, and continued to 
influence the situation by assuming a role in the judgment of the murderers, along with 
William Clito.132  Further, the king assisted William Clito in strengthening his hold on the 
county by besieging William of Ypres, who had falsely claimed inheritance of the county 
without the approval of the Flemish barons.133   
While William Clito was not the count for long, this does not reflect any 
weakness in royal support.  After Thierry of Alsace asserted himself as the count of 
Flanders, Louis VI continued to support William Clito and only a small number of 
Flemish barons supported Thierry.  William died during one of his sieges against his 
rival, yet both Galbert of Bruges and Ordericus Vitalis agree that the king’s appointee 
was suppressing the revolts with a large measure of success until his premature death.134   
Louis VI’s actions in Flanders and Aquitaine demonstrated the French crown’s 
growing ability to engage in the affairs of more distant counties and duchies.  With the 
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augmentation of royal power in the Île-de-France stemming from the destruction or 
seizure of numerous castles and the financial benefits that accompanied this process, the 
king started to reestablish his rights in the feudal hierarchy.  He asserted his rights as a 
lord over a vacant fief after the death of Count Charles of Flanders, and he succeeded in 
forcing his vassal the Duke of Aquitaine to present a sub-vassal at the royal court.   
The account of Louis VI defending the kingdom further represents his elevated 
status throughout the realm.  As the German Emperor, Henry V, planned an invasion of 
the French kingdom, Louis VI unified the counts and dukes of the various provinces of 
the kingdom to stand against the German army.  Once Henry V realized the strength of 
the French army, he chose to halt his military campaign.135  The French king was able to 
use his refurbished image to combine the independent forces of the kingdom for its own 
defense. 
His accomplishments both gained him the acceptance and support of the 
population in the royal domain and bolstered his prestige in the surrounding territories.  
This latter development, coupled with the security of the royal domain, allowed him to 
extend his interests to the outer counties of the kingdom.  As a legacy to his successors, 
Louis VI forced his vassals to respect (if not always comply with) the new foundations of 
royal political and military power. 
Still, defeating the local lords was only the first step in consolidation.  Simply 
eliminating the insubordinate lower nobility was not enough; it was necessary to assert 
his control over the territories through the actions of his local royal officers, as many of 
the offices developed because of the elimination of the lords as figures of public 
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authority.  It was vital for the king not to allow these officers merely to replace their 





RESULTS OF ROYAL EXPANSION 
 
Following the removal of numerous lords within the royal domain, the monarchy 
benefited both from having fewer hostile nobles to contend with and from the acquisition 
of new lands and military structures.  The most obvious result of the military successes of 
Louis VI was the elimination of rival military factions close to royal territories and 
towns; however, the king also benefited financially from the extension of royal rights to 
new areas through justice and tax collection.  He instilled new administrators in these 
areas to manage these royal concerns, namely prévôts.  The monarch and his entourage 
were able to travel more freely through the royal domain and there was less fear of 
disrupted communications from Paris to the Orléanais.  With all of these new advantages, 
the monarchy grew in political and financial strength, and the king became more directly 
associated with local authority. 
The progression of royal power increased as Louis VI kept at least eleven of the 
castles that had formerly been in the possession of defiant nobles.  Gournay, Saint-
Sévère, Ferté-Boudoin (Alais), Mantes, Montlhéry, Corbeil, Germigny, Ypres, 
Châteaufort, Montmorency, and Rochefort all came into the ownership of the crown 
during the reign, as recorded either in the chronicles or in charters.136  Most obviously,
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these centers represented royal military security and were from then on accessible for use 
in future campaigns.  These possessions operated as bases of supply and fortification, 
available for the king and his forces to subdue neighboring lords.  Castles and palaces 
were also places for the administration of the domain, and it was easier to move the king 
from one castle to another rather than to transport and set up his entire living quarters in 
rural areas.137 
While the king gained no strongholds when he destroyed the fortifications of 
barons, the annihilation of the fortresses had a significant effect.  During his various 
military campaigns, Louis VI was able to destroy eight fortifications including towers, 
castles, and palaces:  Montmorency, Mouchy-le-Châtel, Meung-sur-Loire, Le Puiset, 
Crécy-sur-Serre, Nouvion, Amiens, and Coucy.138    These castles represented the 
military strength of the baronial opposition within the royal domain, and by removing 
that source of power for the barons, Louis VI enhanced his direct control over the 
territories formerly dominated by the castellans.139  Defeat of castellans also brought 
safety to that area because of the elimination of a rival military threat.140  This left the 
monarchy as the sole authority within that locality, represented either by the king 
personally or, as was more often the case, by his local officers.  Louis VI and his 
successors profited from this new direct authority as the majority of taxes and customs 
collected thus went to the crown instead of the barons. 
There appears to be no systematic principle used by the king to determine which 
castles to maintain and which to destroy.  Much of the decision depended on the ease 
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with which he captured a castle.  Leo and his men defended Meung-sur-Loire until the 
royal forces burned it down with the defenders still inside; however, other fortified 
structures, such as Le Puiset and Amiens, the king saw fit to dismantle following royal 
victories resulting from surrender.  The distances of these castles from Paris were not a 
factor.  Louis VI eradicated Nouvion and Crécy-sur-Serre, located around ninety miles 
northeast of Paris, while he kept Germigny and Saint-Sévère, established over one 
hundred and sixty miles to the south.141  There was also no connection between a 
stronghold and its proximity to a larger urban area.  Again, Germigny and Saint- Sévère 
were located near Bourges and remained a part of the royal network, yet the king 
disposed of Meung-sur-Loire positioned near Orléans.  This topic needs further 
investigation.  For the purposes of this essay, it shall simply be accepted that the king felt 
that maintaining these fortifications would prove more valuable than their removal. 
Royal authority progressed through the replacement of hostile castellans with 
trusted associates in possession of castles and towers as well.  The monarch returned the 
castle of Luzarches to his loyal vassal, Hugh of Clermont, following the capitulation of 
Count Mathew of Beaumont.   Louis VI led a siege against Hugh of Crécy at his castle of 
Gournay, after which the king “kept the castle for himself, entrusting it to the care of the 
Garlandes.”142  After recapturing the castle of Montlhéry from his rebellious half-brother, 
Philip, Louis VI entrusted it to his loyal vassal, Milo of Bray.143  By providing these 
minor nobles with patronage, he ensured their loyalty in any future affairs involving those 
particular structures.  The opportunity for gaining the benefices of former castellans was 
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also an incentive for other lords to become loyal to the king.  Although these locations 
did not fall directly to the authority of the king and his officials, royal influence became 
more direct and common in these areas and there was no longer a hostile attitude towards 
the monarchy.  Once a loyal baron replaced a hostile one, that location then accepted the 
king as the feudal lord with specific rights of justice. 
There was not always a need to extend authority through warfare.  Louis VI also 
bought five castles consisting of Moret, Châtelet-en-Brie, Böesses, Yèvre-le-Châtel, and 
Chambon from Fulk, Viscount of Gâtinais; and erected four more castles at Janville, 
either Chaumont or Montchauvet, Lorrez-le-Bocage, and Gres.144  These castles assisted 
in expanding royal influence to the south and southeast of Paris.  Their position also 
helped maintain secure routes to the southern towns of Orléans and Bourges.  Yèvre-le-
Châtel, Böesses, and Chambon were close in proximity and there existed a significant 
number of smaller villages in the countryside surrounding these castles.  Moret and 
Châtelet-en-Brie could have provided safety for merchants or acted as important 
marketplaces because both were located on rivers. 
While Louis VI already controlled numerous prévôts and the rights of justice in 
various localities in the royal domain, the expansion of territory necessitated the creation 
of new local officials and the establishment of the crown’s rights in these areas.  There 
were either twenty-one or twenty-two prévôts in existence at the end of Louis VI’s reign, 
which included Beauvais, Bellegarde-du-Loiret, Bourges, Château-Landon, Compiègne, 
Corbeil, Dourdan, Dreux, Étampes, Laon, Lorris, Mantes, Melun, Monlhéry, Orléans, 
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Paris, Poissy, Pontoise, Senlis, Sens, Soisy, and perhaps Pithiviers.145  There was a prévôt 
recorded in the charters at Sulli as well, adding one more to the list.146  At least three of 
these local administrators — Corbeil, Mantes, and Montlhéry — owed their positions to 
the military achievements of the crown.  The addition of these officers brought the 
extension of royal privileges and control.  Not only did this improve significantly the 
financial gains of the monarchy through tax collection, but more importantly, these 
officers signified the expansion in royal jurisdiction to these locations.  This meant the 
king could personally impose his court over any judicial matters in these areas without 
having to respect the courts of the lower nobility. 
Louis VI’s actions in Flanders and Aquitaine, as mentioned in the fourth chapter, 
demonstrated the French crown’s growing ability to engage in the affairs of more distant 
counties and duchies.  Following the elimination of local lords as threats, the relative 
degree of control within the royal domain allowed the monarch to divert his attention to 
other parts of the French kingdom.  There was no longer a need to maintain the ability for 
a quick response against sudden attacks in the territories under royal protection. With 
sufficient safety back home, Louis VI was able to travel abroad and not fear surprise 
assaults during his absence or on the return journey. 
Another reason for the king’s ability to extend his military engagements outside 
of the royal domain was the ease with which he was able to travel within the royal 
domain without hostility.  The king and his forces captured or destroyed twenty 
fortifications in the royal territory.  Prior to their destruction or seizure, these castles and 
towers often operated as geographical barriers for the movements of the king and his 
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forces.  The destruction or capture of these military bases allowed the king to move 
quickly and unhindered through his domain.  Just to the south of Paris, simply traveling 
to Orléans, Louis VI had to avoid Montlhéry, Le Puiset, Corbeil, and Ferté-Alais, before 
he eliminated the threat of all four structures.  To the north, Montmorency and Mouchy-
le-Châtel were both hostile to the king at some point in the reign.    Gournay stood to the 
east, Mantes to the northwest, and Rochefort to the southwest.  At the outset of the reign, 
it appeared as though there was a hostile structure owned by an insubordinate lord in 
every direction around Paris.  Traveling around these structures to avoid unwelcome 
military engagements must have required significant amounts of time.   
The expeditions to both Aquitaine and Flanders were products of the new 
mobility of the king’s forces.  They occurred in the later stages of his reign after 
numerous campaigns in the royal domain resulted in the removal of hostile fortifications.  
To the northeast of Paris, towards Flanders, Coucy, Nouvion, and Crécy-sur-Serre were 
no longer in existence when Louis VI traveled to the county of the murdered Charles in 
1127.  Saint-Sévère and Germigny had recently come into the possession of the king 
when he traveled south to Clermont in 1126.  These castles are positioned around seventy 
miles from the city in the Auvergne, which itself is two hundred and thirty miles south of 
Paris.147  Abbot Suger understood the value of royal castles located in close proximity to 
those of his enemies so the royal armies could retreat to a safe position within a near 
castle rather than one farther away.148 
Movement of personnel was not the only royal function previously hindered by 
the castles of opposition; communications also suffered during the castles’ existence and 
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benefited after their removal.  The military success of the king helped him establish sure 
communications between the various parts of his territory, creating a continuous and 
homogenous royal domain.  Before the destruction of Corbeil and Montlhéry, the barons 
who owned these castles were enemies of the monarchy and often intercepted royal 
communications between Paris, Etampes, and Orléans.  With the acquisitions of the new 
territories and fortifications, “the communications were open between Paris, Melun, Sens, 
the Gâtinais, the Etampois, the Orléanais, which formed from then on a single territorial 
cohesion,” solidified through the king’s purchases of Count Fulk’s holdings.149   
This argument pertaining to the improvements of communications has important 
implications for the ability of the crown to handle the inevitable internal administrative 
dilemmas, which will receive proper attention in the following chapter.  With the 
attainment of new lands and towns came the necessity for new royal administrators eager 
to benefit from their offices; however, now the king was able to communicate much more 
efficiently with both those complaining about local officials and the local officials 
themselves.  The local officials south of Paris had thrived in the knowledge that the 
hostile lords hindered royal supervision.  Removal of those barons brought scrutiny and 
less independence to the royal administrators. 
The elimination of the nobles also brought recognition and support from those 
comprising the majority of the population, the peasantry.  One of the authors of the 
Chronicle of the Abbey of Morigny characterized Hugh of Crécy as “an oppressor of the 
poor and a greedy murderer of peasants who wanted to carry out all his crimes at 
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once.”150  Following the king’s conquest of Hugh of Crécy, “the safety that comes with 
peace gladdened the hearts of the peasants.”151  Ordericus Vitalis considered Le Puiset a 
safe haven for criminals, who did not fear the threats of the king or the Church because of 
their false perception of safety.  After Louis VI defeated Hugh Le Puiset, “he razed the 
fortress, to the great joy both of travelers and the country people residing in the 
neighborhood.”152  With the new absence of the local lords, the peasantry became 
accustomed to the direct authority of the royal officials as representatives of the crown 
and considered themselves under his protection. 
Through the crown’s relationship with the Church, a growth in hostilities with 
local lords occurred as Louis VI defended the Church resulting in the expansion of royal 
rights and jurisdiction.  The king profited from the elimination of barons and the 
acquisition of new fortifications.  The monarchy gained more funds to assist in any future 
military endeavors through taxation, extended direct royal justice to numerous towns and 
villages, and further developed the security of the royal domain.  This would be a 
continuing trend during the reigns of Louis VI’s son, Louis VII, and his grandson, Philip 
II “Augustus”.   
With this increased amount of local administration over the course of thirty years, 
there was also a need to expand the royal bureaucracy.  To fill the gaps left in local 
government from the removal of the nobles, the king appointed new local officials to 
control and supervise the rights of the monarch in the new localities as the administration 
that existed at the beginning of the reign was insufficient.  The number of charters or acts 
produced in the reigns of Philip I and Louis VI alone supports this notion.  Including his 
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co-rule with his father, Philip I produced only one hundred and seventy-one over a span 
of forty-eight years, while Louis VI confirmed three hundred and fifty-nine during thirty-
nine years, counting his years as co-ruler.153  Although the crown profited from the 
expansion of royal authority, there would be a continuing need to protect the Church, this 
time from royal officials.  The local governments were able to operate with the addition 
of the new administrative officials, but there was no significant increase in the number of 
officials on the central level of government.  The old and new local officials found a 
relative ease in abusing their authority for financial gains because of the still-limited or 
complete lack of central supervision.  This development eventually required the direct 
intervention of the crown and limitations on the duties of the prévôts. 
                                                 





NEW NEED TO DEFEND THE CHURCH 
 
The addition of new royal rights and the installation of local administrative 
officials, known as the prévôts, represented the extension of royal authority into the 
newly acquired areas, yet the exploitative acts of these new officials would necessitate 
further intervention by the king.  Louis VI appointed these local officials, yet they also at 
times abused their judicial and financial authority.  Although the crown extended the 
royal authority by buying territory and destroying or commandeering the castles of the 
rebellious nobles in the royal domain, the acts of extortion performed by the existing and 
newly installed prévôts forced the king to create reforms to minimize the economic stress 
caused by the corrupt local officials.  The royal intervention that halted the unjust actions 
of the prévôts proved invaluable to the continuation of direct royal control over local 
administration.  This is the real achievement of Louis VI as the king of France; he did not 
simply eliminate the threat of the baronial opposition in the royal domain, he 
consolidated his authority by not allowing the prévôts to usurp the royal rights and to 
revert the monarchy to one of limited influence. 
Prévôts possessed many of the same governmental functions formerly controlled 
by the barons in government administration but differed in that the central government 
supervised the appointment of the prévôts and the office was not hereditary.  Intruding on 
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the exactions of these local officials prevented them from attaining the same political and 
economic footing enjoyed by the insubordinate nobility and thereby causing the same 
problems for the monarchy as possible military threats.  These reforms caused a 
redistribution of local authority.  Louis VI eliminated the conflict of interest among the 
prévôts by delegating some administrative responsibilities to rural abbeys, thus 
establishing an extended bureaucracy without furthering central control.  While Louis VI 
already controlled numerous prévôts and the rights of justice in various localities in the 
royal domain, the expansion of territory necessitated the creation of new local officials 
and the establishment of the crown’s rights.   
The responsibilities of the prévôts extended to most aspects of government 
administration on the local level.  These officials held policing duties ranging from 
securing local fairs to capturing criminals.  They acted as royal representatives when the 
presence of the king was unavailable.  Tax collection was another responsibility they 
assumed.  Prévôts also handled the implementation of the king’s justice.   
As the only group capable of maintaining the burden of police functions in their 
localities, the prévôts and their officers held a considerable amount of public power.  
Following the assassination of Gérard of Quierzi, the king ordered the prévôt of Laon to 
arrest Gaudri, the bishop of Laon, and his entourage, who were responsible for the crime.  
Louis VI also ordered the officials to burn the houses of these clergymen and to 
confiscate their property.  During the fair hosted by the canons of Saint-Etienne of Dreux, 
the prévôt of Orléans and his officers received instructions to defend the fair against 
anyone who intended to do harm to the members of the church.  Addressing the 
merchants of Paris, the king allowed the seizure of property of those who owed the 
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bourgeoisie outstanding debts.  Louis VI ordered the prévôt of Paris to assist the 
merchants with a “forceful hand” if necessary.154  These charters illustrate that once the 
barons lost their public authority, the policing responsibilities fell to the royal officials of 
any particular area. 
Part of the policing responsibilities of the prévôts included detaining prisoners.  In 
the event that any inhabitant of the town of Juvisi did not pay the required taxes to the 
priory, the prévôt of Montlhéry would detain the miscreant until he made payment.  
Guillaume of Ypres captured one of the murderers of Charles the Good and transported 
him to the prévôt of Bruges for confinement and torture “under the most severe of 
pain.”155  The example of Ivo of Chartres’s imprisonment by Hugh Le Puiset mentioned 
in chapter two demonstrates that local lords had formerly held the responsibility of 
holding prisoners, yet the decrease in the number of barons in the royal domain meant 
such duties came under the aegis of the prévôts. 
Prévôts also acted as royal representatives.  The inhabitants of the town of 
Corbreuse were given permission to continue cultivating the land next to the forest of 
Notre-Dame.  This consent rested “on the condition that the inhabitants of Corbreuse had 
four legitimate witnesses attest, in front of the royal prévôt of Dourdan, that these lands 
had been effectively cultivated” during the reign of Philip I.156  The king intended this 
oath to prevent any encroachments on the lands of the forest.157  The townsfolk swore to 
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the prévôt in place of the crown, which signified his importance as a substitute for royal 
representation.   
Another example of these local officials representing the crown occurred at the 
behest of the king again.  When Louis VI and his son allowed the monks of Notre-Dame 
and Saint-Nicaise to hold a fair at Meulan, “order was given to all the royal prévôts to 
announce this fair to all the cities and all the castles of the crown.”158  Therefore, the 
subjects viewed these officials as speaking for royal authority. 
Collecting taxes came under the jurisdiction of the prévôts.  In explaining the 
privileges of the abbey of Saint-Vincent of Senlis, the king commanded that all of the 
individuals under the jurisdiction of the abbey and any other merchants selling goods in 
the royal market had to pay the hauban to the royal prévôts, not the officials of the 
abbey.159  The inhabitants of Sens had to pay the local official the sum of five sous.160  
Furthermore, as will be shown later, the majority of the exemptions given to the churches 
and abbeys included freedoms from excessive taxes collected by the local officials. 
Defense of the prévôté from outside invasion was another function of the royal 
officials.  The king promised the clergymen of the abbey of Bethléem that in times of 
need, the prévôt would assist the monks against any threat within their castle.  If the king 
or his son were unable to defend the monks personally, the prévôt proceeded in their 
stead.  Louis VI declared that the monks of Montmartre became the benefactors of the 
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protection of the local prévôt.161  These examples illustrate that the royal officials held 
access to some degree of military force supported by the monarch. 
Arguably, the most important role the prévôts served involved their position as 
the judicial authority within the prévôté.  In a legal dispute over a fief, the Abbot Téoul of 
Saint-Crépin the Great claimed that Aloud of Soissons had taken the fief illegally.  Upon 
the death of Aloud, the abbot hoped to assert control of the fief, disinheriting Aloud’s 
daughter and son-in-law, Aude and Vilard.  Having heard about the dispute, “the king, 
informing the litigants by a letter to Téoul, [sent] to Soissons the royal prévôt, Hugue 
Acharin, for judging the case and ending the disagreement.”162  Again, further examples 
provided later in the chapter contribute to the significance of the prévôts’ duties, as the 
king gave many exemptions from the justice of the prévôts to abbeys and churches.  
Here, it is important to note that the royal officials were responsible for the judicial 
proceedings for criminal cases and, in extreme circumstances, cases of litigation. 
The overarching influence of the prévôts in every facet of government on the 
local level allowed them to take advantage of their offices.  Prévôts generated more 
revenues for themselves by overtaxing the subjects, sending the expected amount on to 
the central administration, and appropriating the remainder.  No one was able to defy 
these officials because of their military capabilities.  Without royal intervention, these 
men pilfered the countryside and towns in ways similar to the approach formerly taken by 
the nobility.   
Unlike the former barons, however, these officials appear to have been more 
directly subordinate to the king.  Indirect involvement of the monarch, through written 
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messages, sufficed to end any local problems, and no evidence exists that indicates 
multiple violations by any particular prévôt.  Both of these characteristics differ from the 
accounts involving the barons.  Once Louis VI exempted a locality from the demands of a 
prévôt, the absence of additional messages suggests no need for repeated intervention.  
As discussed in chapter four, the king often had to take military action against numerous 
barons, who disobeyed royal commands on multiple occasions. 
While little evidence exists concerning the personal aspects of individual prévôts 
or their lives, it is important to attempt to determine the social status of the officials to 
explain the motives behind their abuse of power.  Of the fourteen names provided in 
Annales de la vie de Louis VI, only one, Hugue de Lèves, has a title separate from the 
office.  The rest of the named prévôts have no other titles, signifying that their status was 
below that of the noble class.163  Many of the documents in which the name of a prévôt 
was given, recorded the men as witnesses to charters of donation along with men of high 
social status, such as archbishops, bishops, abbots, and counts.  This implies that these 
officials were of a worthy status to note their presence among barons and clergymen; 
hence, their social rank eclipsed that of the common peasant.  Combining these two 
pieces of evidence, the prévôts existed in the social hierarchy somewhere between the 
lower-noble and peasant classes.   
Capetian kings did not directly appoint the individuals to fill the offices of the 
prévôté.  The crown sold these local posts to the highest bidder in a fashion similar to an 
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auction.  This provided any individual, who held significant revenue, with the 
opportunity to purchase an office without concern for their social status or intentions.  In 
return for the flat fee, these officials “administered the royal lands and pocketed the royal 
dues within the prévôté and the neighboring lordships.”164  Therefore, the prévôts only 
regained their revenue by generating funds from the royal rights of taxation and justice.165   
The social status of the prévôts explains their incentive for unjustly generating 
funds.  Because these men held no titles, the income received for their royal offices was 
more than likely their major source of revenue.  It is easy to comprehend the reason for 
the crown to choose such individuals.  Aside from the small incomes coming from lands 
or businesses they held prior to attaining office, their success depended on royal support.  
Maintaining a higher social and economic status than most peasants allowed them to 
purchase the office; however, they did not have the same resources as the nobility to 
present a political or military problem with their office unless the crown did not limit 
their aggressive pursuit of social advancement. 
The king also used this technique successfully in the central government.  This 
became the practice of Louis VI after almost making the costly mistake of allowing 
Stephen de Garlande to assume too much control of the central government.  Garlande 
and his brothers were wealthy nobles.166  Once Stephen de Garlande had accumulated the 
numerous ecclesiastical benefices mentioned in chapter three, and both the offices of 
seneschal and chancellor of the royal household, he attempted to establish his family 
(through his brothers) as the lawful inheritors of the offices.167  Following this incident, 
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the king no longer allowed the same individual to occupy both offices within the royal 
household.  As previously mentioned, counselors of the royal court, such as Abbot Suger, 
came from humble origins, and their success now depended on royal favor.   
Yet this factor was not enough to keep the officials honest.  Aspirations to climb 
the social ladder through the acquisition of land and vassals affected the prévôts, who 
attempted to use extortion to achieve those goals.  Far removed from direct royal 
supervision, these men of lower social distinction than nobles aspired to gain sufficient 
funds for the opportunity to purchase lands, increase holdings, and elevate social status.  
They considered the offices their possessions because the point of purchasing the office 
was to procure as much profit as possible from it.168  In essence, these officials hoped to 
“bridge the gap between the upper peasantry and the lower echelons of the 
aristocracy.”169 
There are multiple examples within the government records that describe a need 
for the king to intervene because the local officials had taken advantage of their 
administrative roles to oppress the abbeys.  How did Louis VI amend these situations?  
These accounts rarely provided complete details of the reforms or the reasons for them; 
however, some contain either information involving the types of changes or a brief 
explanation. 
Certain statutes disclose the direct abuses of the prévôts.  Upon the request of 
Abbot Arnaud of Saint-Pierre le Vif, the king granted unspecified “liberties and 
exemptions accorded to the said monastery by his predecessors and notably by Robert 
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II.”170  The only liberty cited was the ability of the abbey to charge merchants that 
traveled through its domain, a custom usually reserved for prévôts.  Excessive taxes 
placed on the abbey by the prévôt of Sens prompted the presentation of the abbey’s 
complaints to the king.171   
Abbot Adam of Saint-Denis defended one of the towns under the control of the 
abbey by means of a grievance delivered to the king.  Beaune-la-Rolande suffered from 
the exactions of the prévôts of Château-Landon and Sulli.  Louis VI permitted the monks 
of the abbey to exercise the rights of justice on the land, yet the crown retained strict 
rights of taxation payable to the prévôts with substantial late fees.172  In this example, it 
appears as though the prévôts abused their rights of taxation to bring judicial charges 
against the members of the town.  To alleviate this problem, the king permitted the abbey 
to hold justice over the inhabitants of Beaune-la-Rolande and the only penalty for unpaid 
taxes was a fine. 
Louis VI gave multiple privileges to the priory, its monks, and the people of 
Bourges.  The first concession effected the “abolition of the vexing customs exercised by 
the prévôt,” which included gîte, hauban and mestive.173  The freedoms came at the 
request of Archbishop Vulgrin of Bourges.  Accounts such as these provide the most 
direct records of the prévôts abusing their authority and the king’s direct intervention to 
curb the abuses. 
                                                 
170 Luchaire, Annales de sa vie, 1121-1136, Bourges no. 578, “abolition des coutumes vexatiores exercées 
par le prévôt,” p. 263. 
171 Luchaire, Annales de sa vie, 1108-1109, Champignelles no. 90, “Libertés et exemptions accordée audit 
monastère par ses prédécesseurs et notamment par Robert II,” p. 48; 1108-1109, Champignelles no. 90, p. 
48. 
172 Luchaire, Annales de sa vie, August 3, 1113, Château-Landon no. 165, p. 84;  
173 Luchaire, Annales de sa vie, 1121-1136, Bourges no. 578, p. 263; mestive was a rent paid by way of 
grain; see Maple, “Domain,” 74-75. 
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Other examples involving exemptions from taxation or justice do not mention 
abuses of the prévôts specifically but do include their inability to violate the exemptions.  
This suggests that the king anticipated abuses of the royal officers and sought to prevent 
them.  In response to Jean II, bishop of Orléans and Etienne, who was both royal 
chancellor and a monk of Saint-Aignan of Orléans, the king “accords to this same abbey 
the justice and the tonlieu, in the interior of the cloister and in all its towns.”174  The 
declaration listed the prévôt as one of the officials unable to transgress these concessions. 
After granting a fair to the abbey of Morigny, in 1117, the king informed Abbot 
Thomas that the monks of the abbey now held the rights of justice and all customs 
collected during the fair.  The king ordered the prévôt not to interfere with the men of the 
abbey through trial or by holding them ransom.  The jurisdiction of the local officials no 
longer included the monks of this abbey.  Similarly in 1120, the monarch announced that 
the abbey of Trinity, a possession of Morigny, received the revenues from numerous 
local taxes and were not answerable to the justice of the prévôt, except for extreme 
crimes.175   
The king notified the priory of Saint-Pierre of Pithiviers that the knight, Gilbert, 
donated the revenues of all customs for a piece of property to the priory, and the monks 
retained the right to try all the inhabitants in the ecclesiastical court of the priory.  Only 
on the authority of the monks could the prévôt assert any duties.  Furthermore, when this 
official operated within this domain, he owed his loyalty to the monks.176  This created a 
                                                 
174 Luchaire, Annales de sa vie, July, 1114, Orléans no. 176, “accorde a cette meme abbaye la justice et le 
tonlieu, dans l’intérieur du cloître et dans la ville,” p. 90. 
175 Luchaire, Annales de sa vie, August 3, 1117, Paris no. 227, p. 111; August 3, 1120, Yévre-le-châtel no. 
292, p. 136. 
176 Luchaire, Annales de sa vie, August 3, 1130, no. 457, p. 213. 
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relationship between the prévôt and the monks similar to one between a vassal and a lord, 
requiring fidelity and the subordination of the one to the other.177 
Unlike the previous accounts that refer to the unjust actions of prévôts, these 
appear to be preventative measures, suggesting that the king predicted unfair exactions 
from the royal officials over specific people, times, or forms of extortion.  It is also 
important to note that these exemptions involved liberties traditionally held by the 
prévôts, whether they involved taxes or justice, causing them to be the most affected in a 
negative way by the king’s orders transmitted through royal charters.  The only order sent 
to the prévôts collectively as a network of local officials supports these arguments.  
Within this report, Louis VI claimed that the monks of Pontigni were exempt from all 
taxes throughout the royal domain.178  To ensure the protection of the monks from any 
type of harassment, the king sent instructions to every prévôt under his authority.  This 
message contained both protection from the authority of the prévôts and a preventative 
approach to any unwarranted exactions. 
Still other accounts include instructions not to prévôts specifically, but generally 
instructions to all royal administrators.  In Paris, the king granted the monks of the Châtre 
of Saint-Denis all of the liberties collected on the land between the abbey and the Seine.  
None of the royal officials maintained the ability to demand customs from those who 
lived in the abbey.  In another situation involving unjust administrators, “the king 
recognizes the injustices of the tailles and exactions that his officers placed on the lands 
                                                 
177 See Fawtier, Monarchy and Nation, for a complete understanding of the feudal relationship between 
lord and vassal. 
178 Luchaire, Annales de sa vie, 1114-1137, no. 606, p. 274. 
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of Saint-Mellon de Pontoise.”179  While these royal exemptions addressed a general 
group of royal officials and not the prévôts alone, these local officials customarily 
fulfilled the responsibilities surrounding the taxes and justice mentioned in the 
concessions.  This indicates at least the inclusion of the prévôts in this group of officials; 
however, it is hard to say whether the king simply implied the prévôts and those under 
their supervision. 
One particular proclamation holds substantial repercussions for direct royal 
authority on the local level, yet its unique nature requires careful consideration.  In this 
charter, the king asserted his right to some taxes over Saint-Martin of Champs, but the 
rendering of these taxes would come directly upon the orders of the king.  This excluded 
the prévôt from the process of tax administration.  In this example, the monks received 
the promises of exemption from all customs, no prévôtal interference, and protection 
from the prévôt.180  This charter’s unique nature results from its reduction of the local 
official to a near subordinate position under the monks.  The prévôt was no longer able to 
fulfill his financial and judicial responsibilities in this location and had to protect the 
monks when dangers were present.  While this represents an important account of 
redistribution of local authority, this was not a common occurrence. 
There remain numerous other accounts that list exemptions from taxes and 
liberties provided to churches and abbeys in the absence of a need to protect.  Acts of this 
nature often denoted the honoring and remembrance of particular individuals.  These 
charters of donation are not the same as those listing exemptions from unjust exactions.  
                                                 
179 Luchaire, Annales de sa vie, August 3, 1115, Paris no. 191, p. 96; August 3, 1122, Pontoise no. 321, “Le 
roi reconnaît l’injustice des tailles et exactions que ses officiers prélevaient sur les terres de Saint-Mellon 
de Pontoise,” p. 149; the taille was a tax on the serfs and peasants living in the royal domain and on the 
peasants of the royal abbeys and bishoprics, see Luchaire, Institutions monarchiques, 1:92. 
180 Luchaire, Annales de sa vie, August 3, 1128, Janville no. 419, p. 193; 1133-1134, no. 550, p. 251. 
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The terminology used is different for the two types of records.  In the acts made for 
protective purposes, the authors of the documents used terms such as “notification” and 
“unjust exactions” and addressed individuals who made requests of relief.  The other 
form of acts, which announced the individual or group allocating the contributions, 
included words such as “donations” and “confirm”.  Differences in the arrangement of 
these charters and the phrases used for both demonstrate the division between acts of 
administration and those of endowments. 
Thus far, there has been a modest amount of evidence to link the rise of prévôtal 
corruption with the decline in the authority of the nobility.  The examination of the 
geographical locations of destroyed fortifications or those coming into royal hands with 
the places where prévôts abused their authority along with the chronology further 
illustrates the connection.  Following the destruction, purchase, or construction of castles 
by the king, royal documents sent to the officials describe the exemption of specific 
monasteries from the exploitations of specific prévôts.  This demonstrates that the prévôts 
experienced a significant increase in their local authority with the removal of barons and 
their traditional baronial authority accompanying the loss of their castles.  The enhanced 
royal presence brought about by the purchase or installation of new fortifications also 
increased prévôtal authority. 
The city of Orléans experienced a significant change in the local authority during 
the reign of Louis VI, which accounts for the new abuses by the prévôt.  A vassal of the 
bishop of Orléans, known only as Leo, controlled the fortification Meung-sur-Loire, 
located eight miles southwest of Orléans.181  When Leo died in 1103, Prince Louis 
destroyed his castle.  The distance between Le Puiset and Orléans was around thirty 
                                                 
181 Suger, The Deeds, 36; all distances taken from the measurements of Richard Cusimano. 
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miles, which was a significant distance; still, the king’s orders to Hugh Le Puiset not to 
overtax the city denote the baron’s local control.  Louis VI eliminated the castle of Le 
Puiset once in 1111 and again in 1112.182  As these nobles lost their castles, they also lost 
their ability to gain revenues from the city either legally or illegally, allowing the 
monarch’s royal officials to succeed to the local administration.  By the year 1114, the 
king had already found it necessary to restrain the prévôt of Orléans by exempting the 
Abbey of Saint-Aignan from his authority.  After the removal of the noble presence near 
Orléans, there was a negligible period of time before the prévôt began to follow similar 
patterns of excessive taxation. 
Bourges experienced similar circumstances, as the priory of Bourges dealt with a 
prévôt who taxed excessively following the removal of a defiant noble.  The lord of 
Bourbon, Amon II, held the castles of Sainte-Sévère and Germigny located southwest and 
southeast of Bourges.  While the distance between Sainte-Sévère and Bourges was fifty-
five miles, Germigny was only thirty miles from Bourges.  Subsequent to two military 
encounters with Amon II, Louis VI kept Sainte-Sévère in 1108 and Germigny in 1109.183    
Only well after the king came into possession of these two fortresses did records indicate 
the prévôt of Bourges beginning to exploit the city, some time between 1121 and 1136.  
Once the monarch had pushed aside Amon II as the dominant figure surrounding 
Bourges, the royal official filled the political and administrative power vacuum in the 
area and proceeded to implement heavy taxes on the priory of Bourges. 
The area around the abbey of the Trinity of Morigny in Pithiviers underwent 
drastic changes as some fortifications disappeared and the crown bought others prior to 
                                                 
182 Suger, The Deeds, 85, 112. 
183 Suger, The Deeds, 59-60, 109. 
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prévôtal exploitation.  Again, the location of Le Puiset was near this abbey, which 
suffered from the exactions of the prévôt of Yèvre-le-Châtel before the charter issued by 
the king in 1120.  The last effort to refortify Le Puiset had occurred in 1118, just two 
years before the king created the charter of exemption.  Louis VI had also purchased 
three castles in the area at Boësses, Chambon, and at Yèvre-le-Châtel itself, providing the 
necessary defenses to secure royal control of the area and ensure the dominance of the 
royal officials.184  According to the charters, prévôts did not begin to abuse their authority 
until after the elimination of local lords, construction of new fortifications, or the 
purchase of castles.  Once the prévôts began to abuse their privileges, the responsibility 
fell to the king to restrain his royal officials and by doing so, he was able to consolidate 
his authority on the local level through maintaining his control over the actions of the 
prévôts. 
The arguments concerning the safe passage of communications in the royal 
domain, previously explained in chapter five, are also applicable to the general 
geographic locations of the majority of the decrees sent to the corrupt prévôts.185  Early in 
the reign, hostile nobles intercepted royal communications dispatched south of Paris.  All 
five charters referring specifically to unjust actions of prévôts originated south of Corbeil, 
Montlhéry, and Ferté-Baudoin, which was the exact direction in which the crown had 
formerly been unable to convey communications with any surety.  Furthermore, of the 
eighteen fortifications that the king either destroyed or retained for himself, only five 
existed north of Paris.  This shows the significant difficulty Louis VI had in 
communicating with his dependents in the south.  Once the infrastructure strengthened, 
                                                 
184 Bouquet, “Ex Continuatione,” 12:123. 
185 See above, 56-57. 
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the king gained the ability to assess and manage the problems with local royal officials, 
which invariably benefited the Church. 
Although all of the charters concern the clergy on some level, the prévôts 
implemented their exactions on the laity as well.  Beaune-la-Rolande, previously 
mentioned in this chapter, was a town simply under the possession of an abbey and 
suffering from prévôtal aggression; however, there are no records of the king presenting 
exemptions for any individual or group not associated with the Church.186  The reason for 
this lopsided documentation rested in the relationship between the crown and the clergy.  
As argued above, the role of the clergy in the various levels of government warranted 
protection of the Church from the king.  High-ranking ecclesiastic officials, such as 
abbots and bishops, maintained the ability to communicate directly with the king and his 
administrative officers.  This contact allowed the monasteries to bypass local courts 
operated by prévôts and appeal to the king’s court, resulting in the charters of exemption.  
The peasantry did not possess the same privileges.  People not associated with the Church 
were subject to the local courts and did not have the means to take their complaints of 
corruption to the king.  Without the close connection between the Church and the crown, 
Louis VI could not have stopped the abuses of authority sustained by the prévôts. 
The eradication of local lords was not enough to secure a new royal power base 
on the local level within the royal domain.  Simply leaving the governmental 
management to the royal officials allowed them to exploit their offices to further their 
own interests.  Instead, it was necessary for the king to retain an active role in limiting the 
extent of tax collection and the management of justice in the new areas of royal control.  
The prévôts held the same administrative and military privileges as the former nobles and 
                                                 
186 See above, p. 68. 
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they more than likely used the new fortifications gained through the military 
accomplishments of the king, which gave them the potential to become a danger to royal 
control of the newly acquired territories.  By carefully observing the actions of the 
prévôts and responding to the requests of the monasteries, he prevented these local 
officials from becoming the over-mighty subordinates who had given him so many 
problems throughout his reign.  These limitations placed on the prévôts proved to benefit 







The reign of Louis VI ended in 1137, and his lasting legacy was one of increased 
royal power and prestige for the French monarchy.  He contributed significantly to 
reclaiming authority within the royal domain and extending it into the largely 
independent territories of his vassals.  Through his consistent cooperation with the French 
Church, he maintained the political and administrative support necessary to reduce the 
number of hostile castellans in the royal domain and to avert the unjust exploitations of 
royal officers.  His royal right to defend monasteries provided him with the “weapon” to 
attack castellans hostile to the clergy and a “shield” of legal justification to call vassals to 
the royal court for their crimes and to secure all of the benefits of his military victories.   
When local officers abused their authority, the clergy was able to use its relationship with 
the king to bring attention to the issue and to end the exactions of the prévôts. 
Louis VI contributed to the number of fortifications controlled by the king 
through both peaceful and coercive means and added to the financial and judicial rights 
of the monarchy.  This brought the necessary security to the royal domain for the safe 
transmission of communications and travel.  By focusing the majority of his military and 
administrative activities largely within the royal domain, he did not overextend his 
resources or lose sight of consolidating control of his immediate realm.  Securing a
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dominant control over the royal domain allowed his successors to operate more freely in 
the surrounding duchies and counties. 
When the opportunities arose, such as the murder of Count Charles in Flanders or 
the capture of a bishopric under the direct protection of the monarchy in the Auvergne, 
Louis VI reestablished as many feudal bonds as his means allowed.  These campaigns 
proved to the powerful vassals of the king that the crown was far from powerless.  The 
improved geographical range of his activities and the recorded chronicles that approved 
of the king revitalized the prestige of the French throne.  This allowed Louis VI to defend 
against a seemingly more powerful Holy Roman Emperor and stave off the English king.  
Through these actions, Louis VI was responsible for preserving the French monarchy.  
He demonstrated that the throne of his ancestors was reemerging as one of the dominant 
monarchies in Western Europe. 
His greatest accomplishment was his consolidation of the authority he had gained, 
not allowing emerging local officials to usurp the royal rights he strove so hard to regain.  
Unlike the successors of Charlemagne, who granted provincial lords royal privileges 
bringing about the deconstruction of royal authority, Louis VI prevented his officials 
from reclaiming those privileges and using them independently from the king to further 
their own causes.  When the use of royal rights went beyond the scope of the prévôts’ 
authority, Louis VI decreased their responsibilities and privileges.   
The monarchy that had once seemed headed for disintegration now turned 
towards centralization.  Reconnecting the local government to the central administration 
by intervening in disputes involving the Church was a significant step towards state 
building.  Within the royal domain, the crown reemerged as the supreme authority in 
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matters of justice, first through the subjugation of castellans, and second, through the 
regulation of the prévôts.  While important, this was only an initial step in building the 
state of the kingdom.  Eventually, in later generations, with increased territorial 
expansion, the need to develop the bureaucracy both in the central government and in the 
localities became clear as royal influence spread on the local level to previously 
independent duchies and counties.  This culminated in the creation of the seneschals, one 
of whose functions was the direct supervision of the prévôts under Philip II.  The 
achievements of Louis VI began the transition of the French kingdom from a kingship 
towards a medieval state. 
This is not to say that Louis VI resolved the problem permanently.  At the end of 
the reign, there was no formal procedure to limit the abuses of the prévôts.  Throughout 
his reign, Louis VI handled each complaint made by the different clergymen on a case-
by-case basis.  He merely used his abilities to produce charters to contend with the 
government’s inability to supervise the officials.  Consequently, there was still a need to 
formalize a system of supervision for the local officials.  Yet, eventually, with the 
precedents set by Louis VI, during the reign of Louis VII, the old administrator Abbot 
Suger would further diminish the prévôts as a threat to local royal control as he made 
these royal officials completely dependent on the crown.  Further still in the reign of 
Philip II, the geographical area under direct royal control became the largest in over three 
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